BLIK cheques (Poland)
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This is not about BLIK transfers (phone to phone). Instead, the PLN payer needs to generate in his banking app a BLIK cheque, which is a 9-digit code, and pass it to PLN recipient. The PLN recipient types it into the ATM of his choice and withdraws cash.
https://blik.com/en/how-to-use-blik#cash-deposits-and-withdrawals (scroll down to "BLIK cheques")
Why
BLIK is hugely popular in Poland and it enables instant cash transfers inside Poland. It's free of charge, easy to use and can be anonymous if additional measures are taken. It would surely
Region
Poland. Major Polish banks support BLIK in/out payments over ATM. Thousands of ATMs in the country.
Currencies
PLN only.
Chargeback risk
Cheque can be revoked at any time prior to cash withdrawal. After that point, the recipient holds hard cash from the ATM and cannot be charged back.
Size of user base
Millions.
Data requirements
The PLN accepter needs to provide no data whatsoever, only the transaction amount. The PLN payer provides a 9-digit cheque and optional withdrawal PIN (if enabled for his bank account), perhaps also the time limitation of the cheque if not default.
Verification
The PLN payer can see the withdrawal was successful in his bank client panel. Since only him and the PLN recipient know the cheque 9-digit code, nobody else can withdraw the money. May be possible to obtain more information from the bank based on the cheque code and transaction date, but this is not a standard procedure. The silent assumption is that this is not a transfer method but self-service ATM withdrawal/deposit method, sharing cheque is just like sharing your Mastercard+PIN. Still, banks see nothing wrong in it and undertake no measures to prevent this so far.
Duration
As much as a trip to your nearest ATM. If the transfer amount surpasses the cheque limit, perhaps multiple ATMs need to be visited in worst case. The default time limit for one BLIK cheque is 24 h.
Fees
Nothing.
Fraud risk
The PLN payer could use the code himself before PLN recipient reaches the ATM and claim it's the recipient who withdrew cash. It is an open question how to prevent this kind of fraud. One idea would be to reverse the process - the PLN recipient generates the code (but it's not a cheque and it's only valid for 2 minutes, which requires strict payer-recipient coordination) and the PLN sender uses this code to deposit cash into recipient's bank account at the ATM. Another idea would be to introduce an escrow (see below).
Payment amounts
20-10000 PLN. Depends on the bank and bank account tier.
Payment description
No.
Extra idea
For increased anonymity, a BLIK broker could be employed. A BLIK broker owns a bank account, accepts BLIK cash payment into his bank account and provides the BLIK cheque for the recipient. This way, the PLN payer only uses cash and the PLN recipient only receives cash. If the broker is compensated for his work by the DAO, additional accountabillity, escrow services and even insurance can be offered. It should also be possible to solve the abovementioned fraud scenario with brokers. The PLN recipient could also choose which BLIK brokers he trusts and ask PLN payer to deposit cash into their accounts, speeding up the process. The BLIK broker can also settle accounts with PLN recipient electronically, with a method of their choice. From Bisq perspective, PLN payer would be elligible for his crypto transaction when PLN is deposited to the broker's account.