Pronounced "asleep". Copyright(c) 2004-2020, Joshua Wright
Due to GLIBC removal of setkey and crypt functions, link to libxcrypt to restore functionality. Minor code cleanup.
Minor update to fix a problem with IFNAMSIZ errors in build on some platforms.
I updated asleap to include the "-C" and "-W" options, where you can specify the challenge value (in colon-delimited bytes) and the response (ditto) on the command-line. This makes asleap more of a generic MS-CHAPv2 dictionary attack tool, which is fine by me.
I spent some time updating asleap and came to the following conclusions:
- My code is much better now than it was in 2003/2004
- I was (something stupid I wrote in 2007)
I removed a lot of functionality that I didn't think was necessary any more in this version, specifically:
- No more support for Airopeek NX files; if you want to read from a .apc file, install Wireshark, and run "tshark -r input.apc -w output.dump" to convert to libpcap format.
- No more integration with Airjack to deauth users. If you still want to deauth users to get their LEAP credentials without waiting, you can use a tool such as file2air, MDK2 or aireplay-ng.
- I stopped caring about Windows a long time ago. If you need this, and you only run Windows, try using a bootable Linux ISO like Backtrack (www.remote-exploit.org) and VMWare.
On the brighter side:
- The code has 90% less teh suck
- Fixed an awful bug where passwords > 64 characters caused genkeys to segfault.
- Added code to handle QoS data frames
- Can handle radiotap-formatted capture files now
This tool is released as a proof-of-concept to demonstrate weaknesses in
the LEAP and PPTP protocols.
LEAP is the Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol, intellectual
property of Cisco Systems, Inc. LEAP is a security mechanism available
only on Cisco access points to perform authentication of end-users
and access points. LEAP is written as a standard EAP-type, but is not
compliant with the 802.1X specification since the access point modifies
packets in transit, instead of simply passing them to a authentication
server (e.g. RADIUS).
PPTP is a Microsoft invention for deploying virual private networks (VPN).
PPTP uses a tunneling method to transfer PPP frames over an insecure
network such as a wireless LAN. RFC 2637 documents the operation and
functionality of the PPTP protocol.
BACKGROUND
LEAP utilizes a modified MS-CHAPv2 challenge/response in order to
authenticate users on a wireless network. The MS-CHAPv2 authentication
method has been clearly identified as a weak method of authentication
for several reasons. A standard LEAP exchange is as follows:
1. STA requests authentication with 802.1X start message
2. AP issues a random 8-byte challenge
3. STA encrypts the 8-byte challenge 3 times, using the NT hash of their
password as seed material. The STA then joins the 3 DES outputs as a
single 24-byte response.
4. AP issues a success or failure message.
5. STA issues a 8-byte challenge.
6. AP responds with a 24-byte response.
7. STA is able to send data to the distribution system.
PPTP networks use a straight implementation of MS-CHAPv2 for authentication,
which is slightly more complex than the LEAP example:
1. STA initiates PPP configuration negotiation options
2. PPTP server (SERVER) issues a random 16-byte challenge
3. STA generates a random 16-byte STA challenge
4. STA uses SHA1 to hash the SERVER 16-byte challenge, the ST challenge
and the STA's username. The first 8-bytes become the 8-byte random
challenge (step 2 in LEAP).
5. STA encrypts the 8-byte challenge 3 times using the NT hash of their
password as see material. The three 8-byte outputs are contcatenated
to generate a single 24-byte response.
6. STA transmits the 24-byte response, the 16-byte STA challenge and the
STA username to the SERVER.
7. SERVER decrypts the 24-byte response with the STA's stored NT password
hash. If the decrypted response does not match the SERVER challenge,
the SERVER issues a PPP CHAP Failure message.
8. If the response does match the SERVER challenge, the SERVER hashes the
STA password hash to create a password-hash-hash.
9. The SERVER combines the password-hash-hash, the literal "Magic server
to client signing constant", and the 24-byte response and calculates a
SHA1 hash.
10.The SERVER calculates the 8-byte challenge using the same procedure in
(4).
11.Combining the output from (9) and (10) with the literal constant "Pad
to make it do more than one iteration", the SERVER calculates another
SHA1 hash.
12.The output of (11) is converted to upper-case ASCII-hexadecimal
representation and transmitted back to the STA.
13.The STA uses steps (8-12) to authenticate* the SERVER.
* If anyone can explain to me why the MS-CHAPv2 algorithm has all this
seemingly unnecessary complexity, please contact me.
Unfortunately, the MS-CHAPv2 challenge/response suffers from several notable
flaws:
+ No salt in used in conjunction with the NT hash
- Permits pre-computed dictionary attacks
+ Weak DES key selection for challenge/response
- Permits recovery of 2 bytes of the NT hash
+ Username sent in clear-text
With these flaws present, we are able to deduce enough information to
mount a dictionary attack against a user's password after capturing their
successful login to a LEAP or PPTP network. Since we are attacking a
wireless network exchange, this is a trivial task with a wireless sniffer.
OUR ATTACK
Since there is no salt in the NT hash, we can precalculate an indexed list
of passwords and their associated NT hashes. This is only marginally
useful to us, since we would normally need to run three rounds of DES
to encrypt the random challenge for each word in our dictionary. Not an
unreasonable task, but certainly time-consuming on a single mobile device
like a laptop or a PDA.
We can significantly reduce the amount of time needed to launch an attack
against the LEAP or PPTP challenge/response by leveraging a second flaw in
the MS-CHAPv2 protocol. When a STA receives a challenge, they encrypt the
challenge three times, using portions of their password hash as DES seeds.
The DES algorithm requires a 7-byte seed value in this algorithm, so the
STA splits their 16-byte NT hash into three portions:
seed1 = HB1 .. HB7
seed2 = HB8 .. HB14
seed3 = HB15, HB16, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
Where HBx is the bytes of the NT hash, and 0x00 is a standard NULL byte.
The flaw with this method is that the third DES output is cryptographically
weak, leaving only 2^16 possible permutations. This can be calculated in
a matter of seconds, even on older Pentium hardware.
By calculating all 2^16 possibilities of the last 8 bytes of the response
value, we can derive the last 2 bytes of the NT hash (HB15, HB16). With the
last two bytes of the NT hash, we can significantly reduce the number
of potential matches in our dictionary file. We can also utilize this
information to perform highly optimized indexed lookups on our dictionary
file, using the known 2 bytes of the users hash as a keying mechanism.
Asleap will examine traffic to identify the LEAP or PPTP challenge/response
process and will extract the username, challenge and response information.
This can be done in a passive operation with a 802.11 card in RFMON mode,
or through an active attack, where asleap impersonates the legitimate access
point, and forces the victim to deauthenticate from the network.
From the STA response and the challenge, asleap will calculate the last two
bytes of the matching NT hash, and display that value. After calculating the
last two bytes of the NT hash, asleap will search the genkeys output file
of dict+hashes for matching hash values. With the matching hash value,
asleap will use it to seed the DES operation and encrypt the challenge,
comparing the output to the captured response from the STA. If the
calculated 24-byte response value matches the captured 24-byte response,
asleap will display the associated clear-text password.
If the password for the LEAP or PPTP user is not present in your dictionary
file, asleap will not be able to report the user's password. The quality
of your dictionary file will have a lot to do with the success of recovering
LEAP/PPTP user passwords.
THE TOOLS
You will need a dictionary file, one word per line, to use with asleap.
Please don't ask me for my dictionary file - be creative and put your
own together. You can use the morewords.pl and strip-nonascii.pl scripts
in the scripts/ directory if desired.
+ STEP 1. Generate the database and index files to use with asleap lookups
by running them through genkeys. Very straightforward:
$ ./genkeys
genkeys 2.0 - generates lookup file for asleap. <jwright@hasborg.com>
genkeys: Must supply -r -f and -n
Usage: genkeys [options]
-r Input dictionary file, one word per line
-f Output pass+hash filename
-n Output index filename
-h Last 2 hash bytes to filter with (optional)
$
I typically use .dat and .idx extensions on the database ("outfile") and
index file, just to keep it straight in my head.
+ STEP 2. Decide how you are going to collect LEAP credentials for use with
asleap. This could be through a live interface in RFMON mode, or through
a previous capture file in libpcap format. Take a look
at the command line options for asleap:
$ ./asleap
asleap 2.0 - actively recover LEAP/PPTP passwords. <jwright@hasborg.com>
asleap: Must supply an interface with -i, or a stored file with -r
Usage: asleap [options]
-r Read from a libpcap file
-i Interface to capture on
-f Dictionary file with NT hashes
-n Index file for NT hashes
-s Skip the check to make sure authentication was successful
-h Output this help information and exit
-v Print verbose information (more -v for more verbosity)
-V Print program version and exit
-W ASCII dictionary file (special purpose)
$
BUGS
I'm certain. Let me know about them.
While not a bug - a word on channel hopping. Use channel hopping only to
look for networks that are running LEAP. If you are always hopping to a
different channel, you are likely going to miss valid targets.
THE FIX
LEAP is inherently weak as it relies on MS-CHAPv2 for authentication of
clients on the wireless network. Cisco seems to acknowledge this fact in
their support of the Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP)
that uses MS-CHAPv2 authentication within a stronger TLS encryption channel.
Users relying on LEAP for WLAN access control should consider switching to
PEAP or TTLS, both open EAP types submitted to the IETF for standardization.
As a short-term measure, LEAP users should immediately audit the passwords
of their users to identify weak passwords. Weak passwords should be expired
and replaced with passwords at least 8 characters in length that consist of
numbers, letters and special characters. This is only a stop-gap measure,
since an attacker with sufficient disk space could create an exhaustive
list of all printable characters to use for their dictionary attacks.
Since PPTP uses the same MS-CHAPv2 algorithm, it suffers from the same
weaknesses as LEAP. Microsoft recommends users select very strong passwords,
or switch to a more secure authentication mechanism such as IPSec or L2TP.
QUESTIONS, COMMENTS, CONCERNS
Please contact jwright@hasborg.com with any questions, comments on concerns.