sherlock-audit/2023-06-bond-judging

BenRai - `optionTokens` can be expired even though the epoch is not over

Opened this issue · 6 comments

BenRai

high

optionTokens can be expired even though the epoch is not over

Summary

When deploying an optionToken the parameter expiry is rounded down to the “nearest day at 0000 UTC” but since the end of an epoch is calculated by the epochDuration and the exact time the epoch has stared and the optionToken was created this can lead to an epoch still being active but the corresponding optionToken to be already expired.

Vulnerability Detail

When starting a new epoch, the variable epochStart is set to the current time (block.timestamp) and the end of the epoch is calculated by adding the epochDuration to the epochStart variable.

The optionToken of the new epoch is deployed with the parameter expire calculated based on the current time stamp, the timeUntilEligible and the eligibleDuration. (uint48(block.timestamp) + timeUntilEligible + eligibleDuration). The final expiration date of the optionToken is rounded down to the “nearest day at 0000 UTC” before the token is deployed.

Since the epochDuration can be as close as 1 second to the sum of timeUntilEligible + eligibleDuration this can lead to an epoch still being active but its optionToken to be already expired.

Example:

epochDuration = 7 days
timeUntilEligible = 0
eligibleDuration = 7 days + 12 hours

New epoch is launched on the 01.01.2024 at 11:45 am.

=>
epochStart = block.timestamp = 01.01.2024 at 11:45 am
epochEnd = epochStart + epochDuration = 08.01.2024 at 11:45 am

initial expire = block.timestamp + timeUntilEligible + eligibleDuration = 08.01.2024 at 11:45 pm

final expire after rounding down = uint48(initial expire/ 1day) * 1 day = 08.01.2024 at 00:00 am

The epoch is still active between final expire and epochEnd even though the option has already expired.

Impact

Users that wait until the epoch has ended to claim their rewards expecting the options to be exercisable for 12 hours after the epoch end cannot claim their options since they are expired already and lose out on all the value the options would have had which can be significant depending on the current price of the payoutToken

Code Snippet

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-bond/blob/fce1809f83728561dc75078d41ead6d60e15d065/options/src/fixed-strike/liquidity-mining/OTLM.sol#L514-L534

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-bond/blob/fce1809f83728561dc75078d41ead6d60e15d065/options/src/fixed-strike/FixedStrikeOptionTeller.sol#L122

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-bond/blob/fce1809f83728561dc75078d41ead6d60e15d065/options/src/fixed-strike/liquidity-mining/OTLM.sol#L605-L611

https://github.com/sherlock-audit/2023-06-bond/blob/fce1809f83728561dc75078d41ead6d60e15d065/options/src/fixed-strike/liquidity-mining/OTLM.sol#L629-L643

Tool used

Manual Review

Recommendation

The expiration of the optionTokens should be rounded up instead of down. This would increase the time an option can be redeemed long enough to prevent the scenario described above.

Oighty commented

Agree with this issue, but would prefer to fix by requiring the expiry to be atleast 1 day longer than the epoch duration. Having expiries all round-down is simpler and consistent with some of our other contracts.

Based on impact, agree with the finding

Users that wait until the epoch has ended to claim their rewards expecting the options to be exercisable for 12 hours after the epoch end cannot claim their options since they are expired already and lose out on all the value the options would have had which can be significant depending on the current price of the payoutToken

Looks likes ok, may also want to round up as well O(∩_∩)O

The expiration of the optionTokens should be rounded up instead of down. This would increase the time an option can be redeemed long enough to prevent the scenario described above.

Oighty commented

See comment above. Our other contracts use expiry values that are rounded down. We want to maintain consistency.

Ok Then the fix looks good!