/cggmp21

State-of-art threshold ECDSA in Rust

Primary LanguageRustApache License 2.0Apache-2.0

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Threshold ECDSA based on CGGMP21 paper

CGGMP21 is a state-of-art ECDSA TSS protocol that supports 1-round signing (requires preprocessing), identifiable abort, provides two signing protocols (3+1 and 5+1 rounds with different complexity of abort identification) and key refresh protocol out of the box.

This crate implements:

  • Threshold (i.e., t-out-of-n) and non-threshold (i.e., n-out-of-n) key generation
  • (3+1)-round general threshold and non-threshold signing
  • Auxiliary info generation protocol
  • Key refresh for non-threshold keys
  • HD-wallets support based on slip10 standard (compatible with bip32)
    Requires hd-wallets feature

A self-contained description of the protocols we implemented is available here.

We also provide auxiliary tools like:

  • Secret key reconstruction (exporting key from TSS)
  • Trusted dealer (importing key into TSS)

This crate does not (currently) support:

  • Key refresh for threshold keys (i.e., t-out-of-n)
  • Identifiable abort
  • The (5+1)-round signing protocol

Our implementation has been audited by Kudelski. Report can be found here.

About notion of threshold and non-threshold keys: originally, CGGMP21 paper does not have support of arbitrary t and only works with non-threshold n-out-of-n keys. We have added support of arbitrary threshold $2 \le t \le n$, however, we made it possible to opt out therhsoldness so original CGGMP21 protocol can be carried out if needed.

Running the protocol

Networking

The most essential part of running an interactive protocol is to define how parties can communicate with each other. Our cggmp21 library is agnostic to the network layer and only requires you to provide two things: a stream of incoming messages and a sink for outgoing messages, i.e.:

let incoming: impl Stream<Item = Result<Incoming<Msg>>>;
let outgoing: impl Sink<Outgoing<Msg>>;

where:

  • Msg is a protocol message (e.g., signing::msg::Msg)
  • round_based::Incoming and round_based::Outgoing wrap Msg and provide additional data (e.g., sender/recepient)
  • futures::Stream and futures::Sink are well-known async primitives.

Once you have that, you can construct an MpcParty:

let delivery = (incoming, outgoing);
let party = round_based::MpcParty::connected(delivery);

The concrete networking implementation to use will depend heavily on the specific application. Some applications may use libp2p; others may prefer having a central delivery server or a database (like Redis or Postgres); some specific applications may want to communicate over a public blockchain, and so on.

Whatever networking implementation you use, keep in mind that:

  • All messages must be authenticated
    Whenever one party receives a message from another, the receiver should cryptographically verify that the message comes from the claimed sender.
  • All p2p messages must be encrypted
    Only the designated recipient should be able to read the message

Signer indices

Our library uses indices to uniquely refer to particular signers sharing a key. Each index i is an unsigned integer u16 with $0 \le i &lt; n$ where n is the total number of parties.

All signers should have the same view about each others' indices. For instance, if Signer A holds index 2, then all other signers must agree that i=2 corresponds to Signer A.

Assuming some sort of PKI (which would anyway likely be used to ensure secure communication, as described above), each signer has a public key that uniquely identifies that signer. It is then possible to assign unique indices to the signers by lexicographically sorting the signers' public keys, and letting the index of a signer be the position of that signer's public key in the sorted list.

Execution ID

Execution of our protocols requires all participants to agree on unique execution ID (aka session identifier) that is assumed never to repeat. This string provides context separation between different executions of the protocol to ensure that an adversary cannot replay messages from one execution to another.

Once signers can talk to each other and share an execution ID, they're ready to do MPC!

Auxiliary info generation

In the usual flow, signers run a protocol for auxiliary-data generation before running distributed key generation. This protocol sets up certain parameters (in particular, Paillier moduli for each of the signers) that will be used during the signing protocols. This protocol can be run as follows:

// Prime generation can take a while
let pregenerated_primes = cggmp21::PregeneratedPrimes::generate(&mut OsRng);

let eid = cggmp21::ExecutionId::new(b"execution id, unique per protocol execution");
let i = /* signer index, same as at keygen */;
let n = /* number of signers */;

let aux_info = cggmp21::aux_info_gen(eid, i, n, pregenerated_primes)
    .start(&mut OsRng, party)
    .await?;

The auxiliary-data generation protocol is computationally heavy as it requires the generation of safe primes and involves several zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs.

On reusability of the auxiliary data

The CGGMP21 paper assumes that new auxiliary data is generated for each secret key that is shared. However, examination of the proof shows that this is not necessary, and a fixed group of signers can use the same auxiliary data for the secure sharing/usage of multiple keys.

Distributed Key Generation (DKG)

The DKG protocol involves all signers who will co-share a key. All signers need to agree on some basic parameters including the participants' indices, the execution ID, and the threshold value (i.e., t). The protocol can be executed as

use cggmp21::supported_curves::Secp256k1;

let eid = cggmp21::ExecutionId::new(b"execution id, unique per protocol execution");
let i = /* signer index (0 <= i < n) */;
let n = /* number of signers taking part in key generation */;
let t = /* threshold */;

let incomplete_key_share = cggmp21::keygen::<Secp256k1>(eid, i, n)
    .set_threshold(t)
    .start(&mut OsRng, party)
    .await?;

The above produces an IncompleteKeyShare. An incomplete key share can be saved on disk by serializing using serde crate. Treat this material appropriately as it contains sensitive information.

Assuming auxiliary-data generation has already been done (see above), you can "complete" the key share using:

let key_share = cggmp21::KeyShare::from_parts((incomplete_key_share, aux_info))?;

Signing

Once signers have a set of "completed" key shares, they can sign or generate presignatures. In either case, exactly the threshold number (i.e., t) of signers must take part in the protocol. As in the DKG protocol, each signer needs to be assigned a unique index, now in the range from 0 to t-1. But the signers also need to know which index each signer occupied at the time of keygen.

In the example below, we do a full signing:

let eid = cggmp21::ExecutionId::new(b"execution id, unique per protocol execution");

let i = /* signer index (0 <= i < min_signers) */;
let parties_indexes_at_keygen: [u16; MIN_SIGNERS] =
    /* parties_indexes_at_keygen[i] is the index the i-th party had at keygen */;
let key_share = /* completed key share */;

let data_to_sign = cggmp21::DataToSign::digest::<Sha256>(b"data to be signed");

let signature = cggmp21::signing(eid, i, &parties_indexes_at_keygen, &key_share)
    .sign(&mut OsRng, party, data_to_sign)
    .await?;

Alternatively, you can generate a presignature and later use it to sign:

  1. Use SigningBuilder::generate_presignature to run the presignature generation protocol
  2. Later, when a signing request is received, each signer issues a partial signature using Presignature::issue_partial_signature
  3. A threshold number of partial signatures can be combined using PartialSignature::combine to obtain a full signature

Never reuse presignatures! If you use the same presignature to sign two different messages, the private key may be leaked.

Sync API

Every protocol is defined as async function. If you need to run a protocol in non-async environment, library provides a wrapper that allows you to execute protocol using sync API only.

To use it, you need to enable state-machine feature. Then, for every protocol definition, you can find a companion function that returns StateMachine which can be used to carry out the protocol. For instance, if you do presignature generation, use signing::SigningBuilder::generate_presignature_sync.

HD wallets support

Library supports non-hardened deterministic key derivation based on slip10 standard (compatible with bip32). It allows signers to generate a master key once, and then use it to instantaneously derive as many child keys as needed. Child key derivation takes place within signing protocol practically at no cost.

In order to use HD wallets, hd-wallets feature must be enabled. Then, a master key needs to be generated by running a regular key generation protocol with hd_wallet set to true.

When master key is generated, you can issue a signature for child key by setting derivation path in the signing.

SPOF code: Key Import and Export

CGGMP21 protocol is designed to avoid Single Point of Failure by guaranteeing that attacker would need to compromise threshold amount of nodes to obtain a secret key. However, some use-cases may require you to create a SPOF, for instance, importing an existing key into TSS and exporting key from TSS.

Such use-cases contradict to nature of MPC so we don't include those primitives by default. However, you may opt for them by enabling spof feature, then you can use trusted_dealer for key import and key_share::reconstruct_secret_key for key export.

Differences between the implementation and CGGMP21

CGGMP21 only defines a non-threshold protocol. To support general thresholds, we defined our own CGGMP21-like key generation and threshold signing protocols. However, we keep both threshold and non-threshold versions of the protocols in the crate, so if you opt for the non-threshold protocol, you will be running the original protocol defined in the paper.

There are other (small) differences in the implementation compared to the original paper (mostly typo fixes); they are all documented in the spec.

Timing attacks

Timing attacks are type of side-channel attacks that leak sensitive information through duration of execution. We consider timing attacks out of scope as they are nearly impossible to perform for such complicated protcol as CGGMP21 and impossible to do in our specific deployment. Thus, we intentionally don't do constant-time operations which gives us a significant performance boost.

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