eCryptfs: A stacked cryptographic filesystem for Linux eCryptfs is free software. Please see the file COPYING for details. For documentation, please see the files in the doc/ subdirectory. For building and installation instructions please see the INSTALL file. Lead developers: Tyler Hicks (kernel) Dustin Kirkland (userspace) Contributors: Michael Halcrow Michael C. Thompson Kent Yoder Trevor Highland Theresa Nelson Former maintainers: Phillip Hellewell Michael Halcrow Web Site: http://ecryptfs.org/ As you should do with any filesystem, make sure to maintain a backup copy of any data you write into eCryptfs. In addition, you should reliably store your secret keys in a secure location. eCryptfs uses industry-standard cryptographic ciphers, key generation, and passphrase protection mechanisms; without your salt/passphrase or private key, nobody will be able to retrieve your data. eCryptfs requires the userspace tools available at: <http://ecryptfs.org/downloads.html> Requirements include: - Kernel version 2.6.19 or above - Build crypto API support with at least one symmetric key cipher - Build key retention support - If you have an older kernel, try the latest eCryptfs full package release to build a stand-alone kernel module - Userspace tools obtainable from the site listed above; requirements for the userspace tools are: - keyutils - David Howells' userspace keyring headers and libraries (version 1.0 or higher) - Finding its way into some distros - Obtainable from <http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/keyutils> KERNEL BUILD OPTIONS Code maturity level options ---> [*] Prompt for development and/or incomplete code/drivers Security options ---> <M> Enable access key retention support Cryptographic options ---> <M> CBC support <M> ECB support <M> MD5 digest algorithm <M> AES cipher algorithms File systems ---> Miscellaneous filesystems ---> <M> eCrypt filesystem layer support (EXPERIMENTAL) NOTES eCryptfs is still in a developmental stage. When you upgrade the eCryptfs kernel module, it is possible that the eCryptfs file format has been updated. For this reason you should copy your files to an unencrypted location and then copy the files back into the new eCryptfs mount point to migrate the files. File format version 3 and beyond (in kernel version 2.6.24) is expected to remain readable, however. BUILD AND INSTALL INSTRUCTIONS 1) Consult the INSTALL file. In the majority of cases, this step should involve the standard procedure for Linux packages: % ./configure --prefix=/usr && make && make install 2) Make sure that you have sysfs mounted and that a valid entry for the sysfs mount point is in your /etc/mtab file. INTERACTIVE MOUNTING Create a new directory into which eCryptfs will write its encrypted files (i.e., /root/crypt). Then, create the mount point directory (i.e., /mnt/crypt). Here is an example of how you might mount eCryptfs: mount -t ecryptfs /root/crypt /mnt/crypt Note that you can also perform a layover mount (essentially, converting an existing path into an eCryptfs mount point) to reduce the likelihood of contention between eCryptfs and other applications for access to the lower files; this is generally the recommended way to mount eCryptfs: mount -t ecryptfs /secret /secret Navigate the menus to select your preferred mount options. NON-INTERACTIVE MOUNTING eCryptfs supports mounting through command-line options. You can do so by passing groups of name=value attribute pairs as a -o option to the mount helper. Each key type has a set of name=value pairs associated with it. For instance, the ``passphrase'' key type can accept a ``passwd=XXX'' name=value pair and a ``salt=XXX'' name=value pair. Attributes that apply to a particular key type immediately follow the key type specifier ``key=XXX'' and are separated by colons. Attributes that do not apply to any specific key type (general attributes) are separated by comma's. The option string will take the form: name1=value1,key=alias:name2=value2:name3=value3,name4=value4,name5=value5 name1=value1, name4=value4, and name5=value5 are all generic global attributes that can apply to any key type. name2=value2 and name3=value3 are specific to the key type. A BNF grammar for the option set follows: <NULL> ::= <letter> ::= (a | b | c | ... | z) <letter-string> ::= <letter> (<letter-string> | <NULL>) <character> ::= <any printable ASCII character that is not , or :> <character-elem> ::= (<character> | <NULL>) <character-string> ::= <character-elem> (<character-string> | <NULL>) <name> ::= <letter-string> <value> ::= <character-string> <attr> ::= <name> "=" <value> <comma-attr-list> ::= <attr> ("," <comma-attr-list> | <NULL>) <colon-attr-list> ::= <attr> (":" <colon-attr-list> | <NULL>) <key-attr-list> ::= "key=" <letter-string> (<colon-attr-list> | <NULL>) <attr-list> ::= (<comma-attr-list> | <key-attr-list>) <options-set> ::= <attr-list> (<attr-list> | <NULL>) Values read from a file should be specified with name value pairs. For example, a passphrase may be specified in a file by adding the following line to the file: passwd=<passphrase> Currently supported aliases and attributes parsed by the mount helper include: key=passphrase: passphrase_passwd=<passphrase> passphrase_passwd_file=/path/to/file passphrase_passwd_fd=<file descriptor> passphrase_salt=<salt value> key=openssl: openssl_keyfile=/path/to/key openssl_passwd=<passphrase> openssl_passwd_file=/path/to/file openssl_passwd_fd=<file descriptor> The following general attributes are valid kernel mount options, and may also be acted upon by the mount helper, mount.ecryptfs: ecryptfs_cipher=<cipher> Currently supported ciphers include: aes blowfish des3_ede cast5 cast6 twofish ecryptfs_key_bytes=<key bytes> With the exception of AES-192, eCryptfs requires that the keysize be a multiple of the block size. ecryptfs_sig=<hex signature> The signature for the FEKEK to use to encrypt the FEK for newly created files. A key with description <sig> should be in the user's session keyring. The mount helper, with its key modules, should make sure that the key gets placed there. ecryptfs_passthrough Allows for non-eCryptfs files to be read and written from within an eCryptfs mount. This option is disabled by default. ecryptfs_xattr_metadata When set, newly created files will have their cryptographic metadata stored in the extended attribute region of the file rather than the header (requires kernel support). ecryptfs_encrypted_view When set, this option causes eCryptfs to present applications a view of encrypted files as if the cryptographic metadata were stored in the file header, whether the metadata is actually stored in the header or in the extended attributes. ecryptfs_hmac When set, eCryptfs will include HMAC integrity enforcement to its files (requires kernel support). ecryptfs_debug=<value> A value greater than 0 enables kernel debug messages, see NOTES below. The following general attributes are parsed only by the mount helper, mount.ecryptfs: no_sig_cache Do not perform any key signature cache checks. By default, when mounting, the eCryptfs mount helper will look for the key signature in <$HOME/.ecryptfs/sig-cache.txt>. If the key signature is not found, then the user will get a warning and will be prompted on whether to continue and whether to add the new key signature to the sig-cache.txt file. This behavior can be suppressed with the no_sig_cache option. If you wish to have the same passphrase used in previous passphrase mounts and store it in a file (*not* recommended unless you can provide sufficient protection of the file itself), you can take the following steps: (Previous mount; specify passphrase on command line) mount -t ecryptfs /mnt/dev /mnt/dir -o key=passphrase:passphrase_passwd=my_passphrase (Next mount; have passphrase read from a file) echo "passphrase_passwd=my_passphrase" > /mnt/secureusb/my_passphrase mount -t ecryptfs /mnt/dev /mnt/dir -o key=passphrase:passphrase_passwd_file=/mnt/secureusb/my_passphrase Saving your unencrypted passphrase to a file on the same disk that contains your encrypted files defeats the purpose of using a cryptographic filesystem in the first place. You should instead store the file that contains your passphrase on a physically secure medium, such as a USB flash drive that you keep locked in a drawer, if you choose to store it to a file at all. In general, it is probably best to just type in your passphrase via stdin every time you need to perform a mount. Future versions of eCryptfs will allow hardware token devices, such as a TPM chip, to protect your secret keys. TESTING A NEW MOUNT POINT Try writing a new file: echo "Hello, World" > /secret/hello.txt The operation will complete. When you unmount eCryptfs, you will Notice that there is a new file in /secret that is at least 12288 bytes in size (depending on your host page size). This is the encrypted underlying file for what you just wrote. To test reading, from start to finish, you need to clear the user session keyring: keyctl clear @u Then umount /secret and mount again per the instructions given above. cat /secret/hello.txt PAM MODULE You can use the PAM module to automatically use a key based on your login passphrase, which can then be used to perform an eCryptfs mount non-interactively. Perform an eCryptfs mount as root, using your user login: root# mount -t ecryptfs /secret /secret Then, grab your raw mount parameters from root# grep "ecryptfs" /etc/mtab You should get something like this: --- /secret /secret ecryptfs rw,ecryptfs_sig=deadbeefdeadbeef,ecryptfs_key_bytes=16,ecryptfs_cipher=aes 0 0 --- Add ``user'' and ``noauto'' to the mount options: --- /secret /secret ecryptfs user,noauto,rw,ecryptfs_sig=deadbeefdeadbeef,ecryptfs_key_bytes=16,ecryptfs_cipher=aes 0 0 --- Append your edited line to your /etc/fstab file. Now it's time to test the mount. root# umount /secret Verify that eCryptfs is not mounted. Then, log in as the regular user. Manually add your passphrase to the user session keyring via the ecryptfs-manager utility. Then, perform the mount, while telling the mount application to not call the mount helper: user# mount -i /secret Verify that eCryptfs mounted correctly. Then, unmount: user# umount /secret Clear your user session keyring: user# keyctl clear @u Add the mount command into your login script (e.g., ~/.bash_profile): --- mount -i /secret --- Finally, add this to the appropriate /etc/pam* file (e.g., /etc/pam.d/login) after the call to pam_unix.so: --- auth required pam_ecryptfs.so --- You will need to insert this intelligently into your PAM stack so that PAM actually calls pam_ecryptfs.so. Depending on your distribution, this may involve, for instance, changing the context of pam_unix.so from ``sufficient'' to ``required'' and moving pam_deny.so to another location in the stack. Be mindful of the security implications of any changes you make to your PAM stack. From another window, try logging in as the user. If all went well, the eCryptfs PAM module will insert a key derived from your login passphrase into the user session keyring. Then, the login script will perform the mount, using the parameters in your /etc/fstab. The script src/utils/ecryptfs-setup-pam.sh attempts to automate setting up PAM mounts on Red Hat-based distros. Use that for inspiration in setting up your own eCryptfs PAM mount. NOTES eCryptfs shipping in kernel version 2.6.19 does not support public key. To determine what your current kernel supports, load the ecryptfs module and view the contents of fs/ecryptfs/version_str under your sysfs mount point. Do not run eCryptfs in higher verbosity levels unless you are doing so for the sole purpose of development, since secret values will be written out to the system log in that case. TROUBLESHOOTING See <doc/ecryptfs-faq.html>. For the most up-to-date FAQ, see <http://launchpad.net/ecryptfs>. BUGS Please send bug reports to the Launchpad bug tracker: * https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+filebug For kernel bugs, please follow the procedure detailed in the kernel documentation (Documentation/oops-tracing.txt) to help us figure out what is happening. Mike Halcrow mhalcrow@us.ibm.com
Mirraz/ecryptfs-utils
git mirror of upstream bzr at http://launchpad.net/ecryptfs-utils. My branch "binary_password" for binary key support.
CGPL-2.0