OpenBitcoinPrivacyProject/wallet-ratings
Criteria for evaluating Bitcoin wallets' privacy properties.
GPL-2.0
Issues
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- 7
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- 17
Preferred Transaction Version
#116 opened by dcousens - 11
Anti-fee sniping counter-measures
#115 opened by dcousens - 0
- 1
Add criteria (NO 5-of-16)
#138 opened by dcousens - 5
Countermeasure against linking IP to address based on first hop analysis: random delays
#136 opened by kristovatlas - 1
Network criteria: Fingerprint specific client version based on SSL cipher suites
#142 opened by kristovatlas - 10
Add Attacker category descriptions
#140 opened by kristovatlas - 18
Determine Severity Benchmarks for 3rd edition
#135 opened by kristovatlas - 0
new criterion: wallet client uses Tor when Tor is running with default configuration
#141 opened by kristovatlas - 1
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- 2
remove duplicate, unlisted countermeasures
#132 opened by kristovatlas - 0
consider rewording attacks related to change instead in terms of output ownership
#134 opened by kristovatlas - 0
reword CR09 (BIP126)
#129 opened by kristovatlas - 1
Alternative to creating identity containers: Just never merge heterogenous inputs
#131 opened by kristovatlas - 0
Re-write all criteria descriptions as questions
#130 opened by kristovatlas - 6
criteria: BIP 126
#102 opened by kristovatlas - 10
rephrase criteria: "Only query one address at a time from a specific connection context"
#103 opened by kristovatlas - 4
- 3
Revisit criterion for number of clicks to import a private key into an identity container
#112 opened by kristovatlas - 0
JSON comment: annotate why bip 62 is listed in list of countermeasures to detecting which output is change
#122 opened by kristovatlas - 14
- 2
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consider detectability as a severity benchmark
#126 opened by kristovatlas - 0
review the network observer, transaction participant, and wallet provider attacks to look for attacks that should be listed commonly but are not yet
#125 opened by kristovatlas - 0
- 0
new attack: wallet provider use order of inputs or outputs to surreptitiously leak info
#123 opened by kristovatlas - 0
consider adding client fingerprinting attack to wallet provider and network observer
#121 opened by kristovatlas - 11
- 1
- 2
de-list the "# of mixing partners" criteria from countermeasure for "risk-free mixing"
#109 opened by kristovatlas - 3
rename countermeasure concerning querying blockchain data for multiple addresses
#110 opened by kristovatlas - 0
who is the target user in the threat model?
#120 opened by kristovatlas - 0
meta-attack: unfriendly contribution setting dissuades participation and thus peer inspection of source code
#119 opened by kristovatlas - 1
- 2
Reword countermeasure about address reuse
#106 opened by kristovatlas - 0
enumerating forensic attacks on data at rest
#117 opened by kristovatlas - 0
Task List for 3rd Edition Report
#114 opened by kristovatlas - 0
Review document comments for “Rating Procedure” from 2nd edition, incorporate into new procedure
#113 opened by kristovatlas - 1
- 4
clarify what is meant by "BIP 62" compliance
#107 opened by kristovatlas - 1
- 2
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- 0
possible new attack/countermeasure/criteria: network provider observes sensitive traffic such as bloom-related queries
#93 opened by kristovatlas