Optimal Auction Design, R. Myerson
- Finding a set of auctions which optimize seller's utility in Nash Equilibrium
Credible Mechanisms, Akbarpour et al.
- Defining credible mechanisms: incentive compatible for the auctioneer to follow the rules
How to Play Any Mental Game, Goldreich et al.
- Algorithm for solving for every multi-party protocol
Limits on the Security of Coin Flips When Half the Processors are Faulty, R. Cleve
- Fair MPC can't be achieved when half the parties are dishonest
- Fairness can be achieved when half the parties are dishonest when posting output to a public bulletin
- Overview of MEV, priotrity gas auctions (PGAs) and the risks they pose on blockchains
Replicating Market Makers, Angeris et al.
- Replicating different portfolio values with liquidity provider positions in automated market makers
Narwhal and Tusk: A DAG-based Mempool and Efficient BFT Consensus
- Fast and high throughput blockchain design through separating out DAG-based mempool generation and consensus