adalanche: Active Directory ACL Visualizer and Explorer
adalanche gives instant results, showing you what permissions users and groups have in an Active Directory. It is useful for visualizing and exploring who can take over accounts, machines or the entire domain, and can be used to find and show misconfigurations.
I Can Haz Domain Admin?
Active Directory security is notoriously difficult. Small organizations generally have no idea what they're doing, and way too many people are just added to Domain Admins. In large organizations you have a huge number of people with different needs, and they are delegated access to varying degrees of power in the AD. At some point in time, someone makes a mistake, and that can cost you dearly.
Download
adalanche is an all-in-one binary - it collects information from Active Directory or from local Windows machines and can the analyze the collected data. If you're only doing AD analysis, just grab the binary for your preferred platform. Later you can deploy the dedicated collector .exe for your Windows member machines via a GPO or other orchestration and get even more insight.
Download either the latest release or the build of the latest commit from Releases. Usually running with the latest commit is fine, but there might be a problem here and there. Releases are considered stable and are for the less adventurous.
Build it yourself
If you prefer full control, you can roll your own:
- Install go 1.17
git clone https://github.com/lkarlslund/adalanchecd adalanche-master- Windows:
build.cmd - Linux/OSX:
./build.sh
First run - full auto
If you're running adalanche on a Windows domain joined machine should just work without any parameters, as adalanche tries to autodetect as much as it can. Under this scenario, and with parameters given, you will run in a collect-analyze mode (collect from Active Directory, then analyze).
For more advanced use (recommended) first collect, with proper options. All your data files (are belong to us), and will end up in the data subfolder (or use --datapath dir to use an alternative folder).
See program options for other possibilities (help or command --help).
Collecting data
Active Directory
The primary source of data is from Active Directory, and is intiated with this command:
adalanche collect activedirectory [--options ...]
If you're on a non-domain joined Windows machine or another OS, you'll need at least the --domain parameter, as well as username and password (you'll be prompted for password if adalanche needs it and you didn't provide it on command line - beware of SysMon or other command line logging tools that might capture your password).
LDAPS (TLS over port 636) is default. If you're on a lab, and you haven't set up CA yet, you will get connection errors because the computer doesn't trust the AD cert. Either disable certificate validation with the "--ignorecert" switch, or change protocol to LDAP with --tlsmode NoTLS --port 389 options.
Example to create data files file for contoso.local:
adalanche collect activedirectory --domain contoso.local --username joe --password Hunter42
There are more options available, for instance on what LDAP contexts to collect, whether to collect GPOs or not etc. Please be aware that you can collect GPOs from Linux by mounting sysvol locally and pointing adalanche to this path for GPO collection - but you will lose ACL analysis for the individual files.
Local Machine (Windows)
For Windows systems that are members of your Active Directory domain (or standalone) you can collect more information from the local machines by running the collector module. There is a stand alone version released as a 32-bit Windows executable, and this works transparently also on 64-bit systems. The idea is that you orchestrate it centraliy with a Scheduled Task via a GPO or whatever means you see fit (psexec, login script etc).
The collector does not require elevated privileges, and runs fine with either the local system account with pricileges stripped or as a random user.
adalanche-collector --outputpath \some\share\where\youcanwrite\butnotread
You can run the local machine collector from the adalance binary too, but this is only included in the 64-bit Windows build:
adalanche collect localmachine [--options ...]
Please remember to secure your collection repository UNC path, so member machines can only create/write/modify files, but not read from them. Only you - the analyst - should be able to do so.
The files will automatically be imported into adalanche when you run it, if they're part of your datapath (in a subfolder or just copied in - whatever works for you)
This will give you insight into who uses what systems, service accounts that are domain users, autoadminlogins, who are local admins, who can RDP into systems and more fun stuff later on :-)
Analysis
This is dead simple - everything you've collected should be in the data directory, either in the main folder or in subfolders. Whatever resides there and adalanche understands is automatically loaded, correlated and used. It's totally magic.
Highly advanced command line to analyze and launch your browser:
adalanche analyze
There are options here as well - try adalanche analyze --help
User Interface
When launched, you get to see who can pwn "Domain Admins" and "Enterprise Admins". Query targets are marked with RED. If you get a lot of objects on this one, congratz, you're running a pwnshop.
PLEASE NOTE THAT:
- SCREENSHOTS ARE OUTDATED AT THE MOMENT
- SOME UI ELEMENTS HAVE MOVED
- THERE ARE MORE ADVANCED ANALYSIS FEATURES NOT YET DESCRIBED HERE
The below examples loaded from the included domain beyond.local, which is a synthetic domain, that has been heavy handedly been messed up using BadBlood. You can try the same analysis with:
adalanche -domain beyond.local analyze
Your browser should pop up with:
No really exciting results on this synthetic AD. Yes, some users are Domain Admins and Administrators. But let's expand the search a bit.
Analysis Methods
Press the "Analysis Methods" tab on the bottom portion of the page, and you get this:
(more methods has been added since this screenshot)
The tool can look for many scenarios, but defaults to fairly simple ones that can get you control of an object. As this yielded nothing, let's try to expand with all methods enabled. Checking the missing boxes, we submit another query.
LDAP query pop-out
When you press the "LDAP Query" tab on the bottom portion of the page, and you get the search interface:
You enter a query for things you want to search for. Optionally you can also add a secondary exclude query, seperating the include and expclude quereries with a comma. Things matching in the exclude query will never get added to the results.
The "Queries" button offers some predefined queries to get you going.
Analyze button gets the show on the road, and runs the query.
Options
-
"Force" button allows you to run requests that returns more than 1000 objects (potentially crashing your browser tab, I don't recommend more than 2500 objects but you can try your luck - be patient).
-
"Max Depth" can limit results by not going further from a target than this depth.
-
Normal searches for other objects that can pwn the selection in your LDAP query (i.e. who can reach these objects)
-
Reverse searches for objects that you LDAP query targets can pwn (i.e. what can these objects reach)
I enabled "Force" as I was warned that the analysis would return more than 1000 objects, and pressed "Analyze / Normal".
Whoa - that's a lot. But can all these objects then suddenly do a system takeover? No, not neccesarily, this depends on the analysis methods used. We enabled the CanDelete*, CanCreate* and InheritsSecurity methods.
Let's investigate what's going on here - right click on one of your targets, and choose "Set as target".
Then right-click on someone else, and choose "Route to target".
Then you'll get a route, which shows the best way to the target.
So here the problem is just a matter of groups being nested members of other groups, but at the very end you see that someone set the DELETE_CHILD flag on the parent container, yielding the right to delete (or potentially move) the target. That does look wrong, doesn't it?
If you examine the "Domain Users" object, you will see that it doesn't have the InheritsSecurity flag, so you can't really pwn it by moving it around.
So try it out on your own data - see what your user can pwn by searching for (&(objectCategory=Person)(Name=YOURLOGIN)) and do a Reverse search. Maybe you'll just end up with the groups that you are a member of, maybe you have access to more than you think ...
Remember, you might get too many results. Limit the selection of targets with (&(attribute=something)(_limit=10)) to just get 10 random targets (see LDAP queries below)
Operational theory
adalanche works a bit differently than other tools, as it dumps everything it can from an Active Directory server, which it then saves to a highly compressed binary cache files for later use. This dump can be done by any unprivileged user, unless the Active Directory has been hardened to prevent this (rare).
If you collect GPOs I recommend using a Domain Admin, as GPOs are often restricted to apply only to certain computers, and regular users can't read the files. This will limit the results that could have been gathered from GPOs.
The analysis phase is done on all cache file, so you do not have to be connected to the systems when doing analysis. This way you can explore different scenarios, and ask questions not easily answered otherwise.
Analysis / Visualization
The tool works like an interactive map in your browser, and defaults to a ldap search query that shows you how to become "Domain Admin" or "Enterprise Admin" (i.e. member of said group or takeover of an account which is either a direct or indirect member of these groups.
LDAP queries
The tool has its own LDAP query parser, and makes it easy to search for other objects to take over, by using a familiar search language.
The queries support:
- case insensitive matching for all attribute names
- checking whether an attribute exists using asterisk syntax (member=*)
- case insensitive matching for string values using equality (=)
- integer comparison using <, <=, > and >= operators
- glob search using equality if search value includes ? or *
- case sensitive regexp search using equality if search value is enclosed in forward slashes: (name=/^Sir.*Mix.*lot$/ (can be made case insensitive with /(?i)pattern/ flags, see https://github.com/google/re2/wiki/Syntax)
- extensible match: 1.2.840.113556.1.4.803 (you can also use :and:) LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_BIT_AND
- extensible match: 1.2.840.113556.1.4.804 (you can also use :or:) LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_BIT_OR
- extensible match: 1.2.840.113556.1.4.1941 (you can also use :dnchain:) LDAP_MATCHING_RULE_IN_CHAIN
- custom extensible match: count - returns number of attribute values (member:count:>20 gives groups with more members than 20)
- custom extensible match: length - matches on length of attribute values (name:length:>20 gives you objects with long names)
- custom extensible match: since - parses the attribute as a timestamp and your value as a duration - pwdLastSet:since:<-6Y5M4D3h2m1s (pawLastSet is less than the time 6 years, 5 months, 4 days, 3 hours, 2 minutes and 1 second ago - or just pass an integer that represents seconds directly)
- synthetic attribute: _limit (_limit=10) returns true on the first 10 hits, false on the rest giving you a max output of 10 items
- synthetic attribute: _random100 (_random100<10) allows you to return a random percentage of results (&(objectCategory=Person)(_random100<1)) gives you 1% of users
- synthetic attribute: _canpwn - allows you to select objects based on what they can pwn directly (&(objectCategory=Group)(_canpwn=ResetPassword)) gives you all groups that are assigned the reset password right
- synthetic attribute: _pwnable - allows you to select objects based on how they can be pwned directly (&(objectCategory=Person)(_pwnable=ResetPassword)) gives you all users that can have their password reset
Detectors and what they mean
| Detector | Explanation |
|---|---|
| CreateUser | Permission in ACL allows entity to create user objects in the container |
| CreateGroup | Permission in ACL allows entity to create group objects in the container |
| CreateComputer | Permission in ACL allows entity to create computer objects in the container |
| CreateAnyObject | Permission in ACL allows entity to create any kind of objects in the container |
| DeleteChildrenTarget | Permission in ACL allows entity to delete all children via the DELETE_CHILD permission on the parent |
| DeleteObject | Permission in ACL allows entity to delete any kind objects in the container |
| InheritsSecurity | This flag simply indicates that the object inherits its security ACL from the parent. If it is moved, the permissins will change to what its new parent dictates |
| ACLContainsDeny | This flag simply indicates that the ACL contains a deny entry, possibly making other detections false positives. You can check effective permissions directly on the AD with the Security tab |
| ResetPassword | The ACL allows entity to forcibly reset the user account password without knowing the current password. This is noisy, and will alert at least the user, who then no longer can log in. |
| Owns | The entity owns the object, and can do anything it wishes to it |
| GenericAll | The entity has GenericAll permissions on the object, which means more or less the same as "Owns" |
| WriteAll | The entity is allowed all write operations |
| WritePropertyAll | The entity can write to any property (same as above, ACL is just a bit different) |
| WriteExtendedAll | The entity is allowed to do all extended write operations |
| TakeOwnership | The entity can make itself the owner |
| WriteDACL | The entity can write to the DACL, effectively giving it all permissions after granting them |
| WriteSPN | The entity can freely write to the Service-Principal-Name attributes using SETSPN.EXE or similar tools. You can then kerberoast the account |
| WriteValidatedSPN | The entity can do validated writes to the Service-Principal-Name attributes using SETSPN.EXE or similar tools. You can then kerberoast the account |
| WriteAllowedToAct | The entity is allowed to write to the ms-DS-Allowed-To-Act-On-Behalf-Of-Other-Identity attribute of the object, so we can get it to accept impersonations what would otherwise not work |
| AddMember | The entity can change members to the group via the Member attribute |
| AddMemberGroupAttr | The entity can change members to the group via the Member attribute (the set also contains the Is-Member-of-DL attribute, but you can't write to that) |
| AddSelfMember | The entity can add or remove itself to the list of members |
| ReadMSAPassword | The entity is allowed to read the plaintext password in the object |
| HasMSA | |
| WriteKeyCredentialLink | The entity can write to the msDK-KeyCredentialLink attribute |
| WriteAttributeSecurityGUID | The entity can write to the AttributeSecurityGUID. I'm not sure if this will work, but it has the potential to allows you to add an important attribute to a less important attribute set |
| SIDHistoryEquality | The objects SID-History attribute points to this entity, making them equal from a permission point of view |
| AllExtendedRights | The entity has all extended rights on the object |
| DCReplicationGetChanges | You can sync non-confidential data from the DCs |
| DCReplicationSyncronize | You can trigger a sync between DCs |
| DSReplicationGetChangesAll | You can sync confidential data from the DCs (hashes!). Requires DCReplicationGetChanges! |
| DCsync | If both Changes and ChangesAll is set, you can DCsync - so this flag is an AND or the two others |
| ReadLAPSPassword | The entity is allowed to read the plaintext LAPS password in the mS-MCS-AdmPwd attribute |
| MemberOfGroup | The entity is a member of this group |
| HasSPN | The entity has a SPN, and can be kerberoasted by any authenticated user |
| HasSPNNoPreauth | The entity has a SPN, and can be kerberoasted by an unauthenticated user |
| AdminSDHolderOverwriteACL | The entity will get it's ACL overwritten by the one on the AdminADHolder object periodically |
| ComputerAffectedByGPO | The computer object is potentially affected by this GPO. If filtering is in use there will be false positives |
| GPOMachineConfigPartOfGPO | Experimental |
| GPOUserConfigPartOfGPO | Experimental |
| LocalAdminRights | The entity has local administrative rights on the object. This is detected via GPOs or the collector module |
| LocalRDPRights | The entity has the right to RDP to the object. This is detected via GPOs or the collector module. It doesn't mean you pwn the machine, but you can get a session and try to do PrivEsc |
| LocalDCOMRights | The entity has the right to use DCOM against the object. This is detected via GPOs or the collector module |
| LocalSMSAdmins | The entity has the right to use SCCM Configuration Manager against the object. This is detected via the collector module. It does not mean that everyone are SCCM admins, but some are |
| LocalSessionLastDay | The entity was seen having a session at least once within the last day |
| LocalSessionLastWeek | The entity was seen having a session at least once within the last week |
| LocalSessionLastMonth | The entity was seen having a session at least once within the last month |
| HasServiceAccountCredentials | The object uses the entitys credentials for a locally installed service, and can be extracted if you pwn the machine |
| HasAutoAdminLogonCredentials | The object is set to auto login using the entitys credentials which is stored in plain text in the registry for any user to read |
| ScheduledTaskOnUNCPath | The object contains a scheduled task that sits on a UNC path. If you can control the UNC path you can control what gets executed |
| MachineScript | Same as above, just as either a startup or shutdown script. Detected via GPOs |
| WriteAltSecurityIdentities | The entity is allowed to write to the Alt-Security-Identities attribute, so you can put your own certificate there and then authenticate as that user (via PKinit or similar) with this certificate |
| WriteProfilePath | The entity can write to the user profile path of the user |
| WriteScriptPath | The entity can write to the script path of the user, giving them instant remote execution when the user logs on |
| CertificateEnroll | The entity is allowed to enroll into this certificate template. That does not mean it's published on a CA server where you're alloed to do enrollment though |
Current limitations
- A large AD with 500.000 objects results in a file approximately 250MB in size
- adalanche requires a reasonable amount of memory - loading and analyzing the above AD will use about 2.5GB RAM - but RAM is cheap, getting pwned is not.
- There are probably mistakes, false positives and stuff I've overlooked. Feedback is welcome!
- There is an unsolved challenge with services that require multiple ACLs to pass (for instance Cert servers only lets members of "Users that can enroll" group use enrollment, while the Certificate Template lets "Domain Users" enroll - this looks like "Domain Users" can enroll to adalanche). The same problem arises with fileshares, so this analysis is not done yet.
Frequently Asked Questions
How does this compare to BloodHound?
Since this is a frequent question, here's a short list of things I know that differentiate. I haven't looked at BloodHound for a long while, and not while doing adalanche - I wanted to try to figure things out myself and not be opinionated because of designs from others.
| Feature | adalanche | BloodHound |
|---|---|---|
| OS compatibility | Win/OSX/Linux | Win/Linux (OSX?) |
| Prerequisites | None | Linux (optional but really not), Java, Python, Perl, Neo4J, Powershell (optional) |
| Initial setup | None | Way too long for my taste |
| GUI | Browser based | Electron based app |
| Data Limitations | RAM bound | None |
| Queries | LDAP syntax + options | Neo4J Cypher |
| Flexibility | Fair | Everything Neo4J Offers |
| Predefined queries | Yes | Yes |
| Helping the world since | 2020 | 2016 |
| Detected as malware | No* | Yes (false positive!) |
*so far
Shoutouts
To everyone messing around with Active Directory - the team behind BloodHound, Will Schroeder @harmj0y, Sean Metcalf @PyroTek3, plus many others that I forgot. The MS API documentation kinda helped, and also other obscure places (stackoverflow FTW) where I dug up technical stuff
If you need inspiration on how to use a detected attack path I can highly recommend that you take a look at PayloadsAllTheThings Active Directory section
Happy hunting!
Feedback is welcome -> @lkarlslund