SmartBomb (not SmartRank) is an innovating escrow with a twist. SmartBomb uses a Michelson timelock chest that acts as a "bomb" which is set by the organizer.
After the organizer locks the tournament prize in the contract, external users can come in and provide payout insurance funds to the game.
There is a major incentive for players to provide insurance. From a game theory perspective, this is what we want.
Once the game is played (off-chain), users who hold Insurance Pool (IP) tokens can accuse the organizer of posting a false list.
If the accusations get to a certain point, the prize is called off and the organizer takes a 5% haircut on the prize (the rest goes back to organizer).
This result is a Bomb Explosion, defuse is blocked by user accusations. Users recieve the Explosion tax spread across all pool members.
The more likely result is a Bomb Defusal by the organizer. Insurance providers will take no action if they think everything is ok, and they will be provided with a 1% insurance tax off the top of the prize pool for participating in insurance.
For roadmap, unfortunately timelock is currently rekt on Tezos so I had to use a lame commit-reveal.
The Timelock addition would be cool because it would protect from a tournement organizer running away or hiding in the Bahamas because anyone can eventually solve the lock and explode/defuse the bomb.
Parameters and fees obviously subject to tinkering. Contract is heavily commented so look there for technicals.
Check the working happy path at KT1BdNUdak4Wg2hc7sxzKnigCdBMTkpu6Evy Ghostnet.
--
Usage
ligo compile contract smartbomb.mligo -e smart_bomb_main > ./smartbomb.tz
ligo compile storage storage_smartbomb.mligo -e smart_bomb_main 'generate_storage'
tezos-client originate contract smartbomb transferring 0 from %YOUR_ADDRESS% running ./smartbomb.tz --init '%STORAGE%' --burn-cap 3
--