/qubes-third-party-integrations

Documentation regarding installation of third-party software in Dom0

qubes-third-party-integration

Documentation regarding issues and possible solutions for integration of third-party software in Dom0.

This is a WIP, not ready to be discussed. Reviewers are greatly appreciated.

Table of contents

Assumptions

We need to make some assumptions:

  1. The package is signed somehow;
  2. The user trusts the key they have imported the Dom0;
  3. The user trust the vendor providing the package.

Once you have bootstrapped your package to Dom0, future updates are easier and may not require user interaction. You can also do an update mechanism safer than the installation mechanism, but if the first installation was compromised, future updates are also compromised.

File archive

There are various types of file archives, for simplicity we will deal only with tar, but the same applies to rpm files. Assuming the user trusts the vendor, they trust everything inside that tarball, issues regarding tar vulnerabilities placing files outside of the desired directory are out of scope, as once the tarball has been verified, assuming the tarball is malicious contradicts trusting the vendor.

The user needs to copy 2 to 3 files to Dom0:

  • The archive and the detached signature of the archive; or
  • The archive, the checksum of the archive and the detached signature of the checksum.

Benefits:

  • Copying these files to Dom0 can easily be done with qvm-run --pass-io.

Problems:

  • There is no easy update mechanism.

RPM repository

RPM repositories are similar to file archives.

Benefits:

  • Easiest update method.

Problems:

  • User has to do more work upfront by editing repository definitions and importing the key to the RPM key database;
  • Maintainer has to keep a server running, burden of maintenance costs and time.

Git repository - bundle

This option regards to git-bundle. User clones your repository, creates a bundle in DomU and pass the file to Dom0.

Benefits:

  • Very easy to do;

Problems:

  • There is no way to sanitize the bundle, it can print arbitrary characters to your Dom0 terminal when cloning, before you can even do signature verification of the repository.
  • There is no easy update mechanism.

Git repository - clone over Qrexec

Cloning over Qrexec is nice! The safest solution is woju/qubes-app-split-git, it can fetch only signed tags but not commits. Other implementations are bare bones and don't sanitize data received from the remote.

Benefits:

  • Available in the contrib repository, thus easily added to Dom0;
  • You can have a trusted repository in Dom0 instead of only release files.

Problems:

  • Git SHA1 collision applies;
  • Can only fetch tags.

Git repository - copying directory

Copying a literal directory can be done with qfile-dom0-unpacker. Copying a git repository might be interesting.

Benefits:

  • Native qubes method sanitizing file names;
  • Can verify signatures from commits or tags with git.

Problems:

  • Very long command, prone to user making typos;
  • Untrusted files in .git/ can make trusting the repository difficult, it can set configuration options, aliases, signature trust level, exclude modified files from being tracked, thus making signature verification difficult to validate.
  • There is no easy update mechanism.

QubesOS-contrib package

The organization QubesOS-contrib is controlled by the Qubes OS Team. Inclusion of new packages is very low. Qubes OS Team doesn't want to include unreviewed formulas and as they don't have the bandwidth to review, they don't include any formula.

Benefits:

  • Easy for the user to install your package.

Problems:

  • Depends on Qubes OS Team having time and resources to review your solution, this can lead to delays of inclusion or never being added at all.