boo-hoo

A library for Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge (NIZKPoKs) for boolean circuits.

This library is experimental Cryptographic Software: use at your own peril.

The idea is that given a program P and some secret input I you can provide a proof that you know some input I such that the output O is equal to P(I). This proof can then be independently checked by anyone knowing the program P and the claimed output O, and they'll be convinced that you know such an I.

This is done via the ZKBoo scheme.

Example

As an example, let's say that you want to create a proof that you know two secret bits x0 and x1 such that x0 & x1 == 1. First, you'll need to create a program which represents this circuit:

use boo_hoo::*;
use Operation::*;

let raw_program = Program::new([
    PushArg(0),
    PushArg(1),
    And,
    PushOutput
]);

Circuits are represented with a stack based bytecode. Operations manipulate elements on the stack. We can move an indexed bit of the input onto the stack with PushArg. We use this in our program to move the two input bits on the stack. Then, we and them together with And. We can also use Not or Xor as other operations. Finally, we move the top element of the stack into the output buffer, with PushOutput.

It's possible that our program is malformed, in that it pops from an empty stack, or accesses undefined elements on the stack. Because of this, we first need to validate our program:

let program = raw_program.validate().expect("failed to validate program!");

The validate method produces a ValidatedProgram, which has been validated against obviously incorrect manipulations, and which knows exactly how many input and output bits the program uses. In our case, the program has two input bits, and two output bits.

Now, we can generate a proof for this program, using our secret inputs:

use rand_core::OsRng;

let ctx = b"example context";
let input = [0b10];
let output = [0];
let proof = prove(&mut OsRng, ctx, &program, &input, &output).expect("input or output were insufficient")

The input and the output are provided as &[u8]. The bits are read from the first byte in the slice to the least, and from the least significant to the most significant bit inside of each byte. If an insufficient number of input or output bits are provided, then the proof construction will fail.

We also pass in a "context". This context makes it so that the proof can only be verified with that context string. This allows binding a proof to a particular application, or even to an arbitrary message. The proof will fail to verify if a different context is used.

Now, we can verify the proof:

let result = verify(ctx, &program, &output, &proof);
assert_eq!(result, Ok(true));

And that's all there is to it, really.

Details

This is a relatively straightforward implementation of the scheme from the paper. In fact, this implementation is very "by-the-books" and intended to be easy to understand, rather than being particularly performant. Operations are done bit-by-bit, which is much more inefficient than operation on u32s or u64s directly. In most boolean circuits for real programs, like SHA256 or other benchmarks, you'll be doing boolean operations on these large bundles, and performance could be greatly improved by processing multiple bits at once.

cronokirby/boo-hoo

boo-hoo

Example

Details