A plug to overwrite the Conn
's remote_ip
based on headers such as X-Forwarded-For
.
IPs are processed last-to-first to prevent IP spoofing, as thoroughly explained in a blog post by @gingerlime. Loopback/private IPs are ignored by default, but known proxies & clients are configurable, so you have full control over which IPs are considered legitimate. You can configure any number of arbitrary forwarding headers to use. If there's a special way to parse your particular header, the architecture of this project should make it easy to open a pull request so RemoteIp
can accommodate.
If your app is not behind at least one proxy, you should not use this plug. See below for more detailed reasoning.
Add :remote_ip
to your list of dependencies in mix.exs
:
def deps do
[{:remote_ip, "~> 0.2"}]
end
Add the RemoteIp
plug to your app's plug pipeline:
defmodule MyApp do
use Plug.Builder
plug RemoteIp
end
Keep in mind the order of plugs in your pipeline and place RemoteIp
as early as possible. For example, if you were to add RemoteIp
after the Plug Router, your route action's logic would be executed before the remote_ip
actually gets modified - not very useful!
You can also use RemoteIp.from/2
outside of a plug pipeline to extract the remote IP from a list of headers. This is useful if you don't have access to a full Plug.Conn
struct, such as when you're only receiving x_headers
using Phoenix sockets:
x_headers = [{"x-forwarded-for", "1.2.3.4"}]
RemoteIp.from(x_headers)
RemoteIp
includes debug-level logging that traces the algorithm as IPs are extracted from headers. This can be useful for tracking down issues with your particular proxy environment.
If these logs are too noisy, you should disable them using Logger
's :compile_time_purge_matching
option with the appropriate metadata:
config :logger, compile_time_purge_matching: [[application: :remote_ip]]
Make sure to recompile this library after reconfiguring Logger
so that the Logger.debug/2
macros get purged:
$ mix deps.compile --force remote_ip
Note that this option is only available in Elixir v1.7 and up.
There are 3 options that can be passed in to RemoteIp.init/1
or RemoteIp.from/2
:
-
:headers
- A list of strings naming thereq_headers
to use when deriving theremote_ip
. Order does not matter. Defaults to~w[forwarded x-forwarded-for x-client-ip x-real-ip]
. -
:proxies
- A list of strings in CIDR notation specifying the IPs of known proxies. Defaults to[]
.Loopback and private IPs are always appended to this list:
- 127.0.0.0/8
- ::1/128
- fc00::/7
- 10.0.0.0/8
- 172.16.0.0/12
- 192.168.0.0/16
Since these IPs are internal, they often are not the actual client address in production, so we add them by default. To override this behavior, whitelist known client IPs using the
:clients
option. -
:clients
- A list of strings in CIDR notation specifying the IPs of known clients. Defaults to[]
.An IP in any of the ranges listed here will never be considered a proxy. This takes precedence over the
:proxies
option, including loopback/private addresses. Any IP that is not covered by:clients
or:proxies
is assumed to be a client IP.
For example, suppose you know:
- you are behind proxies in the 1.2.x.x block
- the proxies use the
X-Foo
,X-Bar
, andX-Baz
headers - but the IP 1.2.3.4 is actually a client, not one of the proxies
Then you could say
defmodule MyApp do
use Plug.Builder
plug RemoteIp,
headers: ~w[x-foo x-bar x-baz],
proxies: ~w[1.2.0.0/16],
clients: ~w[1.2.3.4/32]
end
or
RemoteIp.from(
x_headers,
headers: ~w[x-foo x-bar x-baz],
proxies: ~w[1.2.0.0/16],
clients: ~w[1.2.3.4/32]
)
Note that, due to limitations in the inet_cidr library used to parse them, :proxies
and :clients
must be written in full CIDR notation, even if specifying just a single IP. So instead of "127.0.0.1"
and "a:b::c:d"
, you would use "127.0.0.1/32"
and "a:b::c:d/128"
.
Proxies are pervasive for some purpose or another in modern HTTP infrastructure: encryption, load balancing, caching, compression, and more can be done via proxies. But a proxy makes HTTP requests appear to your app as if they came from the proxy's IP address. How is your app to know the "actual" requesting IP address (e.g., so you can geolocate a user)?
Solution: Many proxies prevent this information loss by adding HTTP headers to communicate the requesting client's IP address. There is no single, universal header. Though X-Forwarded-For
is common, options include X-Real-IP
, X-Client-IP
, and others. Due to this lack of standardization, RFC 7239 defines the Forwarded
header, fulfilling a relevant XKCD truism.
Per the Plug.Conn
docs:
remote_ip
- the IP of the client, example:{151, 236, 219, 228}
. This field is meant to be overwritten by plugs that understand e.g. theX-Forwarded-For
header or HAProxy's PROXY protocol. It defaults to peer's IP.
Note that the field is meant to be overwritten. Plug does not actually do any overwriting itself. The Cowboy changelog espouses a similar platform of non-involvement:
Because each server's proxy situation differs, it is better that this function is implemented by the application directly.
Solution: As definitively verified in elixir-lang/plug#319, users are intended to hand-roll their own header parsers.
Solution: There are a handful of plugs available on Hex. There are also the comments left in the elixir-lang/plug#319 thread that may give you some ideas, but I consider them to be non-starters - copying/pasting code from github comments isn't much better than hand-rolling an implementation.
None of the available solutions I have seen are ideal. In this sort of plug, you want:
- Configurable Headers: With so many different headers being used, you should be able to configure the ones you need with minimal work.
- Configurable Proxies and Clients: With multiple proxy hops, there may be several IPs in the forwarding headers. Without being able to tell the plug which of those IPs are actually known to be proxies, you may get one of them back as the
remote_ip
. - Correctness: Parsing forwarding headers can be surprisingly subtle. Most available libraries get it wrong.
The table below summarizes the problems with existing packages.
Headers? | Proxies? | Correct? | Notes | |
---|---|---|---|---|
plug_cloudflare | ✖️ | ✖️ | ➖ | Just for CF-Connecting-IP , not really a general purpose library |
plug_forwarded_peer | ✖️ | ✖️ | ✖️ | Only parses Forwarded and X-Forwarded-For , X-Forwarded-For takes precedence over Forwarded , does not parse all of RFC 7239's supported syntax correctly, vulnerable to IP spoofing |
plug_x_forwarded_for | ➖ | ✖️ | ✖️ | Can only configure one header, all headers parsed the same as X-Forwarded-For , vulnerable to IP spoofing |
remote_ip_rewriter | ✖️ | ➖ | ✔️ | Only parses X-Forwarded-For , recognizes private/loopback IPs but known proxies are not configurable |
Solution: These are the sorts of things application developers should not have to worry about. RemoteIp
aims to be the proper solution to all of these problems.
There are 2 main tasks this plug has to do:
- Parse the right
req_headers
. - Compute the right
remote_ip
.
When RemoteIp
parses the Conn
's req_headers
, it first selects only the headers specified in the :headers
option. Their relative ordering is maintained, because order matters when there are multiple hops between proxies. Consider this request:
- Client at IP 1.2.3.4 sends an HTTP request to Proxy 1 (no forwarding headers)
- Proxy 1 at IP 1.1.1.1 adds a
Forwarded: for=1.2.3.4
header and forwards to Proxy 2 - Proxy 2 at IP 2.2.2.2 adds an
X-Forwarded-For: 1.1.1.1
header and forwards to the application - The application at IP 3.3.3.3 receives the request from IP 2.2.2.2 with the headers
Forwarded: for=1.2.3.4
&X-Forwarded-For: 1.1.1.1
Thus, if RemoteIp
is configured to accept both Forwarded
and X-Forwarded-For
headers (which it is by default), it would process the list
[{"forwarded", "for=1.2.3.4"}, {"x-forwarded-for", "1.1.1.1"}] # this is what we get
not the reverse
[{"x-forwarded-for", "1.1.1.1"}, {"forwarded", "for=1.2.3.4"}] # this is NOT what we get
After selecting the allowed headers, each string is parsed for its IP addresses (each IP address being the tuple returned by :inet
functions). Each type of header may be parsed in a different way. For instance, Forwarded
has a key-value pair format specified by RFC 7239, whereas X-Forwarded-For
contains a comma-separate list of IPs.
Currently, Forwarded
is the only header with a format specifically recognized by RemoteIp
. All other headers are parsed generically. That is, they are parsed as comma-separated IPs. This should work for X-Forwarded-For
and, as far as I can tell, X-Real-IP
& X-Client-IP
as well. New formats are easy to add - pull requests welcome.
With the list of IPs parsed, RemoteIp
must then calculate the proper remote_ip
. Continuing with the above example, we'd have the list of IPv4 addresses
[{1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 1, 1, 1}]
To prevent IP spoofing, IPs are processed right-to-left. You can think of it as working backwards through the chain of hops:
- The
2.2.2.2 -> 3.3.3.3
hop setX-Forwarded-For: 1.1.1.1
. Do we trust this header? Yes, becauseRemoteIp
assumes that there is at least one proxy sitting between your app & the client that sets a forwarding header, meaning that 2.2.2.2 is tacitly a "known" proxy. - The
1.1.1.1 -> 2.2.2.2
hop setForwarded: for=1.2.3.4
. Do we trust this header? It depends, because we would need to configureRemoteIp
with the:proxies
option to know that 1.1.1.1 is a proxy. If we didn't, we wouldn't trust the header, and thus should stop here and say the original client was at 1.1.1.1. Otherwise, we should keep working backwards through the hops. Assuming we do... - The
1.2.3.4 -> 1.1.1.1
hop set no headers, so we've arrived at the original client address, 1.2.3.4.
Now suppose a client was trying to spoof the IP by setting their own X-Forwarded-For
header:
- Client at IP 1.2.3.4 sends HTTP request to Proxy 1 with
X-Forwarded-For: 2.3.4.5
- Proxy 1 at IP 1.1.1.1 adds to the header so it now reads
X-Forwarded-For: 2.3.4.5, 1.2.3.4
and forwards to Proxy 2 - Proxy 2 at IP 2.2.2.2 adds to the header so it now reads
X-Forwarded-For: 2.3.4.5, 1.2.3.4, 1.1.1.1
and forwards to the application - The application at IP 3.3.3.3 receives the request from IP 2.2.2.2 and
RemoteIp
parses out the IPs[{2, 3, 4, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 1, 1, 1}]
If we configure 1.1.1.1 as a known proxy but not 1.2.3.4, then the right-to-left processing gives us the correct client IP 1.2.3.4 - instead of the attempted spoof, 2.3.4.5.
Not only are known proxies' headers trusted, but also requests forwarded for loopback and private IPs, namely:
- 127.0.0.0/8
- ::1/128
- fc00::/7
- 10.0.0.0/8
- 172.16.0.0/12
- 192.168.0.0/16
These IPs are filtered because they are used internally and are thus generally not the actual client address in production.
However, if (say) your app is only deployed in a VPN/LAN, then your clients might actually have these internal IPs. To prevent loopback/private addresses from being considered proxies, configure them as known clients using the :clients
option.
-
Only use
RemoteIp
if your app is behind at least one proxy. Because the last forwarding header is always tacitly trusted, it would be trivial to spoof an IP if your app wasn't actually behind a proxy: just set a forwarding header. Besides, there isn't much to be gained from this library if your app isn't behind a proxy. -
The relative order of IPs can still be messed up by proxies amending prior headers. For instance,
- Request starts from IP 1.1.1.1 (no forwarding headers)
- Proxy 1 with IP 2.2.2.2 adds
Forwarded: for=1.1.1.1
- Proxy 2 with IP 3.3.3.3 adds
X-Forwarded-For: 2.2.2.2
- Proxy 3 with IP 4.4.4.4 adds to
Forwarded
so it saysForwarded: for=1.1.1.1, for=3.3.3.3
Thus,
RemoteIp
processes the request from 4.4.4.4 with the first-to-last list of forwarded IPs[{1, 1, 1, 1}, {3, 3, 3, 3}, {2, 2, 2, 2}] # what we get
even though the actual order was
[{1, 1, 1, 1}, {2, 2, 2, 2}, {3, 3, 3, 3}] # actual forwarding order
A potential solution to this problem is to add both 2.2.2.2 and 3.3.3.3 as known proxies. Then either way the original client address will be reported as 1.1.1.1. As always, be sure to test in your particular environment.
See CONTRIBUTING.md for instructions on how to open issues or pull requests.
While RemoteIp
has morphed into something distinct from the Rails middleware of the same name, the Rails code was definitely where I started. So I'd like to explicitly acknowledge the inspiration: this plug would not have been possible without poring over the existing implementation, discussions, documentation, and commits that went into the Rails code. ❤️
Required reading for anyone who wants to think way too much about forwarding headers:
- @gingerlime's blog post explaining IP spoofing
- Rails'
RemoteIp
middleware - Rails' tests
- The extensive discussion on rails/rails#7980