Secure the Pandas library and its dependencies in a Python environment, ensuring safe operation particularly in restricted or "jailed" setups. Identify potential security risks involving unsafe system operations and mitigate them.
pandas==2.2.2 ├── numpy [1.22.4] ├── python-dateutil [2.9.0.post0] │ └── six [1.16.0] ├── pytz [2024.1] └── tzdata [2024.1]
In Pandas, operations that could potentially lead to unauthorized system access are typically related to:
- File I/O Operations: These involve reading from or writing to files on the filesystem. If these functions are used improperly, they can expose or alter sensitive files.
- External Command Execution: While Pandas itself does not generally execute system commands, it might call libraries or extensions that do.
- Network Operations: Pandas does not directly support many network operations, but it can interact with URLs or network data sources through its data I/O functions.
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Create a new python environment with version 3.10.14
-
Run
pip install -r requirements.txt
-
cd into the numpy directory and run
pip install .
-
cd into the pandas directory and run
pip install .
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Mitigating XSS vulnerabilities
Issue: By default, jinja2 sets autoescape to False.
Solution : By setting autoescape=True, you mitigate XSS vulnerabilities by automatically escaping variables in your templates, which helps prevent malicious injection of code into your HTML output.
The snippets below are the modified snippets
Location: ./pandas/io/formats/style.py:3615:18
3614 class MyStyler(cls): # type: ignore[valid-type,misc]
3615 env = jinja2.Environment(loader=loader, autoescape=True)
3616 if html_table:
Location: ./pandas/io/formats/style_render.py:73:10
72 loader = jinja2.PackageLoader("pandas", "io/formats/templates")
73 env = jinja2.Environment(loader=loader, trim_blocks=True, autoescape=True)
74 template_html = env.get_template("html.tpl")
Location: ./pandas/tests/io/formats/style/test_html.py:22:10
21 loader = jinja2.PackageLoader("pandas", "io/formats/templates")
22 env = jinja2.Environment(loader=loader, trim_blocks=True, autoescape=True)
23 return env
Location: ./web/pandas_web.py:453:16
452 templates_path = os.path.join(source_path, context["main"]["templates_path"])
453 jinja_env = jinja2.Environment(loader=jinja2.FileSystemLoader(templates_path), autoescape=True)
454
- Using sanitized URLs
Issue: Usage of urllib.request.urlopen
, which can potentially allow opening URLs with file scheme (file://
) or custom schemes. Allowing these schemes can lead to unexpected behavior and security vulnerabilities.
Solution : To mitigate this issue, you should review the usage of urllib.request.urlopen
and ensure that it only opens URLs with permitted schemes. In our case, I restricted it to http://
and https://
schemes for accessing remote resources.
Location: ./pandas/io/common.py:288:11
(Old Snippet)
def urlopen(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
"""
Lazy-import wrapper for stdlib urlopen, as that imports a big chunk of
the stdlib.
"""
import urllib.request
return urllib.request.urlopen(*args, **kwargs) # noqa: TID251
(New Snippet)
def urlopen(*args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
"""
Lazy-import wrapper for stdlib urlopen, as that imports a big chunk of
the stdlib.
"""
import urllib.request
"""
Safe wrapper for urllib.request.urlopen that restricts permitted schemes.
"""
permitted_schemes = ('http', 'https')
url = args[0] if args else kwargs.get('url', None)
if not url:
raise ValueError("URL not provided.")
parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
if parsed_url.scheme not in permitted_schemes:
raise ValueError(f"Unsupported URL scheme: {parsed_url.scheme}")
try:
return urllib.request.urlopen(*args, **kwargs)
except urllib.request.URLError as e:
print(f"Failed to open URL: {url}. Error: {e}")
return None
There is no need to make any modifications to IO utilities such as pandas.read_csv()
, DataFrame.to_csv()
and other related functions as when you study the call graph any access to a file is eventually handled by builtin open()
, which appropriately handles any kind of unauthorized access to a file gracefully.
- Mitigating shell injection attacks
Issue : getstatusoutput
from the subprocess module, starts a process with a shell. This can lead to security vulnerabilities, such as shell injection attacks if the command includes unsanitized input.
Solution: To mitigate this risk, we need to avoid getstatusoutput
and instead use the subprocess.run
function.
Location: ./numpy/distutils/cpuinfo.py:29:25
(old snippet)
28 try:
29 status, output = getstatusoutput(cmd)
30 except OSError as e:
(new snippet)
28 try:
29 args = cmd.split()
30 result = run(args, capture_output=True, text=True)
31 status = result.returncode
32 output = result.stdout
33 except OSError as e:
Issue: Using shell=True
in subprocess.Popen is that it can introduce security vulnerabilities, particularly command injection attacks, if the input is not properly sanitized
Solution : To mitigate this risk, you should avoid using shell=True
and instead provide the command as a list of arguments.
Location: ./numpy/distutils/exec_command.py:283:15
(old snippets)
282 # it encounters an invalid character; rather, we simply replace it
283 proc = subprocess.Popen(command, shell=use_shell, env=env, text=False,
284 stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
285 stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
286 except OSError:
(new snippets)
284 if isinstance(command, str):
285 command = command.split()
286 proc = subprocess.Popen(command, env=env, text=False,
287 stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
288 stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)
- Unsanitized URLs
Issue: Using urlopen without validating the URL can allow the use of potentially dangerous schemes like file://
or custom schemes, which can introduce security vulnerabilities.
Solution : To mitigate this risk, you should restrict the URL schemes to only those that are necessary and safe (e.g., http
and https
).
Location: ./numpy/lib/_datasource.py:336:17
(old snippet)
def _isurl(self, path):
"""Test if path is a net location. Tests the scheme and netloc."""
# We do this here to reduce the 'import numpy' initial import time.
from urllib.parse import urlparse
# BUG : URLs require a scheme string ('http://') to be used.
# www.google.com will fail.
# Should we prepend the scheme for those that don't have it and
# test that also? Similar to the way we append .gz and test for
# for compressed versions of files.
scheme, netloc, upath, uparams, uquery, ufrag = urlparse(path)
return bool(scheme and netloc)
(new snippet)
def _isurl(self, path):
"""Test if path is a net location. Tests the scheme and netloc."""
# We do this here to reduce the 'import numpy' initial import time.
from urllib.parse import urlparse
parsed_url = urlparse(path)
# Check if both scheme and netloc are present
if parsed_url.scheme and parsed_url.netloc:
return True
# If scheme or netloc is missing, prepend 'http://' to the path and re-parse
if not parsed_url.scheme:
parsed_url = urlparse('http://' + path)
return bool(parsed_url.scheme and parsed_url.netloc)
return False
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The first next natural step is to the extend on our work, find more of such security flaws in pandas/numpy source code, or may be identify some new ones.
-
Although I scouted through some other dependencies to look for security flaws, I might have just missed those. So we also need to closely examine the security flaws in
python-dateutil
,pytz
,tzdata
and fix them. -
On any further development of pandas or any of its dependencies, practice secure coding, don't expose any vulnerabilities.