Arcade.xyz facilitates trustless borrowing, lending, and escrow of NFT assets on EVM blockchains. This repository contains the core contracts that power the protocol, written in Solidity.

Relevant Links

🌐 Website - Our app website, with a high-level overview of the project.
📝 Usage Documentation - Our user-facing documentation for Arcade and the Pawn Protocol.
💬 Discord - Join the Arcade community! Great for further technical discussion and real-time support.
🔔 Twitter - Follow us on Twitter for alerts and announcements.

Overview of Contracts

See natspec for technical detail.

Custody

VaultFactory

The Vault Factory is an ERC721 that tracks ownership of Asset Vault contracts (see OwnableERC721). Minting a new VaultFactory token involves deploying a new AssetVault clone, and assigning the token's ID to the uint160 derived from the clone's address.

Token ownership represents ownership of the underlying clone contract and can be transferred - however, to prevent frontrunning attacks, any vault with withdrawals enabled cannot be transferred (see AssetVault).

AssetVault

The Asset Vault is a holding contract that functions as a bundling mechanism for multiple assets. Assets deposited into the vault can only be withdrawn by the owner, and the vault contract itself's ownership is tracked by an ERC721 (see VaultFactory).

AssetVaults are created with withdrawals disabled, and enabling withdrawals is an irreversible "unwrapping" operation. Vaults with withdrawals enabled cannot be transferred. Deposits are always possible, by sending a given asset to the vault's contract address. Asset Vaults can hold ETH, ERC20s, ERC721, ERC1155, and CryptoPunks.

The owner of a vault can also place an arbitrary call via the vault, in order to access utility derived from NFTs held in the vault. Other contracts can delegate the ability to make calls. In practice, an Asset Vault custodied by LoanCore delegates calling ability to the borrower, such that the borrower can access utility for a collateralized vault. The protocol maintains a list of allowed calls (see CallWhitelist).

CallWhitelist

A global whitelist contract that all Asset Vaults refer to in order to allow/disallow certain calldata from being used in the vault's call functionality. Transfer methods are blacklisted in order to prevent backdoor withdrawals from vaults. The contract owner can choose to add or remove target addresses and function selectors from the list.

Verification

ItemsVerifier

A contract that parses a payload of calldata and a target AssetVault, and decodes the payload in order to use it for logic proving or disproving defined predicates about the vault. The ItemsVerifier decodes the calldata as a list of required items the vault must hold in order for its predicates to pass. In the future, other contracts implementing ISignatureVerifier can support other calldata formats and associated validation logic.

Loan Lifecycle

LoanCore

The hub logic contract of the protocol, which contains storage information about loans (expressed by the LoanData struct), and all required logic to update storage to reflect loan state, as well as handle both the intake and release of asset custody during the loan lifecycle. Only specialized "controller" contracts have the ability to call LoanCore (see OriginationController and RepaymentController).

During active loans, the collateral asset is owned by LoanCore. LoanCore also collects fees for the protocol, which can be withdrawn by the contract owner. LoanCore also tracks global signature nonces for required protocol signatures.

PromissoryNote

An ERC721 representing obligation in an active loan. When a loan begins, two types of notes - a BorrowerNote and LenderNote - are minted to the respective loan counterparties. When a loan ends via payoff or default, these notes are burned. The token IDs of each note are synced with the unique ID of the loan.

Only the holder of the LenderNote can claim defaulted collateral for a different loan. When a loan is active and secured by an AssetVault, only the holder of the BorrowerNote can access utility for the collateralized assets using the vault's call function.

OriginationController

The entry point contract for all new loans - this contract has exclusive permission to call functions which begin new loans in LoanCore. The Origination Controller is responsible for validating the submitted terms of any new loan, parsing and validating counterparty signatures to loan terms, and handling delegation of signing authority for an address.

When a loan begins, the Origination Controller collects the principal from the lender, and the collateral from the borrower. Loans can also be initialized with an ERC721 Permit message for collateral, removing the need for a prior approval transaction from the borrower for assets which support permit.

In addition to new loans, the Origination Controller is the entry point for rollovers, which use funds from a new loan to repay an old loan and define new terms. In this case, the origination controller contract nets out funds from the old and new loan, and collects any needed balance from the responsible party.

RepaymentController

The repayment controller handles all lifecycle progression for currently active loans - this contract has exclusive permission to call functions in LoanCore which repay loans, in whole or in part, or claim collateral on loan defaults. This contract is responsible for validating repayments inputs, calculating owed amounts, and collecting owed amounts from the relevant counterparty. This contract also contains a convenience function for calculating the total amount due on any loan at a given time.

FeeController

The fee controller is a contract containing functions that return values, in basis points, for assessed protocol fees at different parts of the loan lifecycle. The fee amounts can be updated by the contract owner.

Version 1

This is version 2 of the protocol. Version 1 of the protocol can be found here.

Breaking Changes from V1

Creating bundles via the old AssetWrapper contract is no longer supported. Each borrower using a bundle should deploy their own vault contract using the VaultFactory to create a new bundle.
AssetVault contracts do not support the deposit{ETH,ERC20,ERC721,ERC1155} methods from AssetWrapper for depositing assets. Deposits are made by transferring asset ownership to the vault.
AssetVaults do not support the withdraw method from AssetWrapper. Every asset held by the vault must be withdrawn individually using the withdraw{ETH,ERC20,ERC721,ERC1155} functions. Each withdraw must specify the particular asset, since the vault does not track what assets it owns - this must be done off-chain. Owners must call enableWithdraw to enable the withdrawal methods on an asset vault. Vaults are non-transferrable with withdraw enabled.
Signed terms must now contain a deadline, interestRate, collateralAddress, and collateralId field. The interest field is no longer supported.
A signature can only be for a specific side of a loan - borrowing or lending. This defined by the side field in the signature. The field is an enum where 0 represents borrowing and 1 represents lending.
A signature must also contain a nonce, a unique ID preventing signature re-use. The nonce must be in the signature payload and provided in initializeLoan.
The typehash for signatures has changed to reflecting these new fields: see _TOKEN_ID_TYPEHASH in OriginationController.sol.
Any repayment functions now take loanId as parameters instead of the appropriate note IDs. Note that in V2 these values are guaranteed to be the same.
PunkRouter is no longer supported. CryptoPunks should be directly transferred to asset vaults for deposits.

Privileged Roles and Access

The Arcade.xyz lending protocol has myriad functionality available to contract owners. This functionality represents a tradeoff between immutability, operational security, and recoverability in the case of exploit.

Arcade.xyz's policy is to assign any ownership functions to a multisig with a subset of signers external to the team, and a signing threshold such that one external signer must always participate. This precludes internal collusion, "rogue insider" attacks, and malicious upgrades. Other groups deploying these contracts should implement their own policies.

CallWhitelist.sol is Ownable and has a defined owner, who can update a whitelist of allowed calls. This whitelist is global to every AssetVault deployed through the VaultFactory. In plain terms, the CallWhitelist owner has the ability to change the allowed functions an AssetVault can call. In practice, ownership follows the stated ownership policy above.
VaultFactory.sol is AccessControl and upgradeable. The only role AccessControl manages is the ADMIN_ROLE. Callers must possess the ADMIN_ROLE in order to perform an upgrade. Since the contract is upgradeable, the contract owner can update the code of the contract as they see fit, which may: _ affect future deployments of AssetVault, causing them to be deployed with different code _ change the way ownership is defined for AssetVault, including pre-existing owners * add additional functionality to the factory In practice, ownership (and thus access to upgradeability) follows the stated ownership policy above.
FeeController.sol is Ownable and has a defined owner, who can update the protocol fees. In practice, this contract may be administered by an internal Arcade.xyz team without external signers, since it defines business logic around fees and has limited functionality. Internal constants define maximum fees that the protocol can set, preventing an attack whereby funds are drained via setting fees to 100%. Note that LoanCore.sol can switch out to a different FeeController entirely.
LoanCore.sol is AccessControl and has a number of defined access roles:
- The ORIGINATOR_ROLE is the only role allowed to access any functions which originate loans. In practice this role is granted to another smart contract, OriginationController.sol, which performs necessary checks and validation before starting loans.
- The REPAYER_ROLE is the only role allowed to access any functions which affect the loan lifecycle of currently active loans (repayment or default claims). In practice this role is granted to another smart contract, RepaymentController.sol, which performs necessary checks, calculations and validation before starting loans.
- The FEE_CLAIMER_ROLE is the only role allowed to update references to the FeeController, and claim any accumulated protocol fees. In practice this role will be assigned to an internal multisig, since withdrawing accumulated fees is a regular aspect of protocol operation.
- The ADMIN_ROLE is the role allowed to perform contract upgrades. Since LoanCore is upgradeable, any aspect of the core protocol may change. Users should be aware that since LoanCore custodies collateral, contract upgrades may change access of security of the collateral. In practice, ownership (and thus access to upgradeability) follows the stated ownership policy above. LoanCore upgradeability is a last-resort feature to only be used in emergencies.
OriginationController.sol is Ownable and upgradeable. The defined owner is the only role which can perform a contract upgrade. Since the contract is upgradeable, the contract owner can update the code of the contract as they see fit, which may: _ change, add, or, remove validation checks for originating loans _ change signature schemes for loan consent Upgradeability is enabled in order to preserve approval state held by the contract. In practice, ownership (and thus access to upgradeability) follows the stated ownership policy above.
PromissoryNote.sol is Ownable, and the owner has exclusive permission to initialize the contract with a reference to an address which is allowed to mint and burn note tokens. In practice, this permission will be granted to LoanCore.sol. Since initialize is called on deployment and can only be called once, in practice, the owner will be the deployer.

jessica0f0116/v2-contracts