Teleport Transactions is software aiming to improve the privacy of Bitcoin.
Suppose Alice has bitcoin and wants to send them with maximal privacy, so she creates a special kind of transaction. For anyone looking at the blockchain her transaction appears completely normal with her coins seemingly going from Bitcoin address A to address B. But in reality her coins end up in address Z which is entirely unconnected to either A or B.
Now imagine another user, Carol, who isn't too bothered by privacy and sends her bitcoin using a regular wallet. But because Carol's transaction looks exactly the same as Alice's, anybody analyzing the blockchain must now deal with the possibility that Carol's transaction actually sent her coins to a totally unconnected address. So Carol's privacy is improved even though she didn't change her behaviour, and perhaps had never even heard of this software.
In a world where advertisers, social media and other institutions want to collect all of Alice's and Carol's data, such privacy improvement is incredibly valuable. And the doubt added to every transaction would greatly boost the fungibility of Bitcoin and so make it a better form of money.
Project design document: Design for a CoinSwap Implementation for Massively Improving Bitcoin Privacy and Fungibility
- State of the project
- How to create a CoinSwap on regtest or testnet
- Developer resources
- Protocol between takers and makers
- Notes on architecture
- Chris Belcher's personal roadmap for the project
- Community
The project is nowhere near usable. The code written so far is published for developers to play around with. It doesn't have config files yet so you have to edit the source files to configure stuff.
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Install rust on your machine.
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Start up Bitcoin Core in regtest mode. Make sure the RPC server is enabled with
server=1
and that rpc username and password are set withrpcuser=yourrpcusername
andrpcpassword=yourrpcpassword
in the configuration file. -
Download this git repository. Open the file
src/main.rs
and edit the RPC username and password in the functionget_bitcoin_rpc
. Make sure your Bitcoin Core has a wallet calledteleport
, or edit the name in the same function. -
Create three teleport wallets by running
cargo run -- --wallet-file-name=<wallet-name> generate-wallet
thrice. Instead of<wallet-name>
, use something likemaker1.teleport
,maker2.teleport
andtaker.teleport
. -
Use
cargo run -- --wallet-file-name=maker1.teleport get-receive-invoice
to obtain 3 addresses of the maker1 wallet, and send regtest bitcoin to each of them (amount 5000000 satoshi or 0.05 BTC in this example). Also do this for themaker2.teleport
andtaker.teleport
wallets. Get the transactions confirmed. -
Check the wallet balances with
cargo run -- --wallet-file-name=maker1.teleport wallet-balance
. Example:
$ cargo run -- --wallet-file-name=maker1.teleport wallet-balance
outpoint address swapcoin conf value
8f6ee5..74e813:0 bcrt1q0vn5....nrjdqljtaq no 1 0.05000000 BTC
d548a8..cadd5e:0 bcrt1qaylc....vnw4ay98jq no 1 0.05000000 BTC
604ca6..4ab5f0:1 bcrt1qt3jy....df6pmewmzs no 1 0.05000000 BTC
coin count = 3
total balance = 0.15000000 BTC
$ cargo run -- --wallet-file-name=maker2.teleport wallet-balance
outpoint address swapcoin conf value
d33f06..30dd07:0 bcrt1qh6kq....e0tlfrzgxa no 1 0.05000000 BTC
8aaa89..ef5613:0 bcrt1q9vyj....plh8x37n7g no 1 0.05000000 BTC
383ffe..127065:1 bcrt1qlwzv....pdqtrg0xuu no 1 0.05000000 BTC
coin count = 3
total balance = 0.15000000 BTC
$ cargo run -- --wallet-file-name=taker.teleport wallet-balance
outpoint address swapcoin conf value
5f4331..d53f14:0 bcrt1qmflt....q2ucgf2teu no 1 0.05000000 BTC
6252ee..d827b0:0 bcrt1qu9mk....pwpedjyl9u no 1 0.05000000 BTC
ac88da..e3ead6:0 bcrt1q3xdx....e7gxtcgrfg no 1 0.05000000 BTC
coin count = 3
total balance = 0.15000000 BTC
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On one terminal run a maker server with
cargo run -- --wallet-file-name=maker1.teleport run-maker 6102
. You should see the messagelistening on port 6102
. -
On another terminal run another maker server with
cargo run -- --wallet-file-name=maker2.teleport run-maker 16102
. You should see the messagelistening on port 16102
. -
On another terminal run a watchtower with
cargo run -- run-watchtower
. You should see the messageStarting teleport watchtower
. In the teleport project contracts are enforced with one or more watchtowers, which are required for the coinswap protocol to be secure against the maker's coins being stolen. -
On another terminal start a coinswap with
cargo run -- --wallet-file-name=taker.teleport coinswap-send
. When you see the terminal messageswaiting for funding transaction to confirm
andwaiting for maker's funding transaction to confirm
then tell regtest to generate another block (or just wait if you're using testnet). -
Once you see the message
successfully completed coinswap
on all terminals then check the wallet balance again to see the result of the coinswap. Example:
$ cargo run -- --wallet-file-name=maker1.teleport wallet-balance
outpoint address swapcoin conf value
9bfeec..0cc468:0 bcrt1qx49k....9cqqrp3kt0 yes 2 0.00134344 BTC
973ab4..48f5b7:1 bcrt1qdu4j....ru3qmw4gcf yes 2 0.00224568 BTC
2edf14..74c3b9:0 bcrt1qfw6z....msrsdx9sl0 yes 2 0.00131088 BTC
bd6321..217707:0 bcrt1q35g8....rt6al6kz7s no 1 0.04758551 BTC
c6564e..40fb64:0 bcrt1qrnzc....czs840p4np no 1 0.04947775 BTC
08e857..c8c67b:0 bcrt1qdxdg....k7882f0ya2 no 1 0.04808502 BTC
coin count = 6
total balance = 0.15004828 BTC
$ cargo run -- --wallet-file-name=maker2.teleport wallet-balance
outpoint address swapcoin conf value
9d8895..e32645:1 bcrt1qm73u....3h6swyege3 yes 3 0.00046942 BTC
7cab11..07ff62:1 bcrt1quumg....gtjs29jt8t yes 3 0.00009015 BTC
289a13..ab4672:0 bcrt1qsavn....t5dsac43tl yes 3 0.00444043 BTC
9bfeec..0cc468:1 bcrt1q24f8....443ts4rzz0 no 2 0.04863932 BTC
973ab4..48f5b7:0 bcrt1q5klz....jhhtlyjpkg no 2 0.04773708 BTC
2edf14..74c3b9:1 bcrt1qh2aw....7xx8wft658 no 2 0.04867188 BTC
coin count = 6
total balance = 0.15004828 BTC
$ cargo run -- --wallet-file-name=taker.teleport wallet-balance
outpoint address swapcoin conf value
9d8895..e32645:0 bcrt1qevgn....6nhl2yswa7 no 3 0.04951334 BTC
7cab11..07ff62:0 bcrt1qxs5f....0j8khru45s no 3 0.04989261 BTC
289a13..ab4672:1 bcrt1qkwka....g9ts2ch392 no 3 0.04554233 BTC
bd6321..217707:1 bcrt1qat5h....vytquawwke yes 1 0.00239725 BTC
c6564e..40fb64:1 bcrt1qshwp....3x8qjtwdf6 yes 1 0.00050501 BTC
08e857..c8c67b:1 bcrt1q37lf....5tvqndktw6 yes 1 0.00189774 BTC
coin count = 6
total balance = 0.14974828 BTC
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Edit the file
taker_protocol.rs
at the start of the functionsend_coinswap
to edit parameters like the total coinswap amount, number of makers to do a multi-hop coinswap with and number of transactions per hop. -
To switch between regtest and testnet, edit the constant
NETWORK
which is found near the top of the filesrc/wallet_sync.rs
. To edit the coinswap send amount, or the number of taker and maker transactions, look in the filesrc/taker_protocol.rs
near the top of the functionsend_coinswap
.
In a two-party coinswap, Alice and Bob can swap a coin in a non-custodial way, where neither party can steal from each other. At worst, they can waste time and miner fees.
To start a coinswap, Alice will obtain one of Bob's public keys and use that to create a 2-of-2 multisignature address (known as Alice's coinswap address) made from Alice's and Bob's public keys. Alice will create a transaction (known as Alice's funding transaction) sending some of her coins (known as the coinswap amount) into this 2-of-2 multisig, but before she actually broadcasts this transaction she will ask Bob to use his corresponding private key to sign a transaction (known as Alice contract transaction) which sends the coins back to Alice after a timeout. Even though Alice's coins would be in a 2-of-2 multisig not controlled by her, she knows that if she broadcasts her contract transaction she will be able to get her coins back even if Bob disappears.
Soon after all this has happened, Bob will do a similar thing but mirrored. Bob will obtain one of Alice's public keys and from it Bob's coinswap address. Bob creates a funding transaction paying to it the same coinswap amount, but before he broadcasts it he gets Alice to sign a contract transaction which sends Bob's coins back to him after a timeout.
At this point both Alice and Bob are able to broadcast their funding transactions paying coins into multisig addresses, and if they want they can get those coins back by broadcasting their contract transactions and waiting for the timeout. The trick with coinswap is that the contract transaction script contains a second clause: it is also possible for the other party to get the coins by providing a hash preimage (e.g. HX = sha256(X)) without waiting for a timeout. The effect of this is that if the hash preimage is revealed to both parties then the coins in the multisig addresses have transferred possession off-chain to the other party who originally didn't own those coins.
When the preimage is not known, Alice can use her contract transaction to get coins from Alice's multisig address after a timeout, and Bob can use his contract transaction to get coins from the Bob multisig address after a timeout. After the preimage is known, Alice can use Bob's contract transaction and the preimage to get coins from Bob's multisig address, and also Bob can use Alice's contract transaction and the preimage to get the coins from Alice's multisig address.
Here is a diagram of Alice and Bob's coins and how they swap possession after a coinswap:
Alice after a timeout
/
/
Alice's coins ------> Alice coinswap address
\
\
Bob with knowledge of the hash preimage
Bob after a timeout
/
/
Bob's coins ------> Bob coinswap address
\
\
Alice with knowledge of the hash preimage
If Alice attempts to take the coins from Bob's coinswap address using her knowledge of the hash preimage and Bob's contract transaction, then Bob will be able to read the value of the hash preimage from the blockchain, and use it to take the coins from Alice's coinswap address.
So at this point we've reached a situation where if Alice gets paid then Bob cannot fail to get paid, and vis versa. Now to save time and miner fees, the party which started with knowledge of the hash preimage will reveal it, and both parties will send each other their private keys corresponding to their public keys in the 2-of-2 multisigs. After this private key handover Alice will know both private keys in the relevant multisig address, and so those coins are in her possession. The same is true for Bob.
Bitcoin's script is used to code these conditions. Diagrams of the transactions:
= Alice's funding transaction =
Alice's inputs -----> multisig (Alice pubkey + Bob pubkey)
= Bob's funding transaction =
Bob's inputs -----> multisig (Bob pubkey + Alice pubkey)
= Alice's contract transaction=
multisig (Alice pubkey + Bob pubkey) -----> contract script (Alice pubkey + timelock OR Bob pubkey + hashlock)
= Bob's contract transaction=
multisig (Bob pubkey + Alice pubkey) -----> contract script (Bob pubkey + timelock OR Alice pubkey + hashlock)
The contract transactions are only ever used if a dispute occurs. If all goes well the contract transactions never hit the blockchain and so the hashlock is never revealed, and therefore the coinswap improves privacy by delinking the transaction graph.
The party which starts with knowledge of the hash preimage must have a longer timeout, this means there is always enough time for the party without knowledge of the preimage to read the preimage from the blockchain and get their own transaction confirmed.
This explanation describes the simplest form of coinswap. On its own it isn't enough to build a really great private system. For more building blocks read the design document of this project.
Makers are servers which run Tor hidden services (or possibly other hosting solutions in case Tor ever stops working). Takers connect to them. Makers never connect to each other.
Diagram of connections for a 4-hop coinswap:
---- Bob
/
/
Alice ------ Charlie
\
\
---- Dennis
The coinswap itself is multi-hop:
Alice ===> Bob ===> Charlie ===> Dennis ===> Alice
Makers are not even meant to know how many other makers there are in the route. They just offer their services, offer their fees, protect themselves from DOS, complete the coinswaps and make sure they get paid those fees. We aim to have makers have as little state as possible, which should help with DOS-resistance.
All the big decisions are made by takers (which makes sense because takers are paying, and the customer is always right.) Decisions like:
- How many makers in the route
- How many transactions in the multi-transaction coinswap
- How long to wait between funding txes
- The bitcoin amount in the coinswap
In this protocol it's always important to as much as possible avoid DOS attack opportunities, especially against makers.
Alice is the taker, Bob, Charlie and Dennis are makers. For a detailed explanation including definitions see the mailing list email here. That email should be read first and then you can jump back to the diagram below when needed while reading the code.
Protocol messages are defined by the structs found in src/messages.rs
and serialized into json with rust's serde crate.
| Alice | Bob | Charlie | Dennis | message, or (step) if repeat
|=================|=================|=================|=================|
0. AB/A htlc ----> | | | sign senders contract
1. <---- AB/A htlc B/2 | | | senders contract sig
2. ************** BROADCAST AND MINE ALICE FUNDING TX *************** |
3. A fund ----> | | | proof of funding
4. <----AB/B+BC/B htlc | | | sign senders and receivers contract
5. BC/B htlc ----------------------> | | (0)
6. <---------------------- BC/B htlc C/2 | | (1)
7. AB/B+BC/B A+C/2---> | | | senders and receivers contract sig
8. ************** BROADCAST AND MINE BOB FUNDING TX *************** |
A. B fund ----------------------> | | (3)
B. <----------------------BC/C+CD/C htlc | | (4)
C. CD/C htcl ----------------------------------------> | (0)
D. <---------------------------------------- CD/C htlc D/2 | (1)
E. BC/C htlc ----> | | | sign receiver contract
F. <---- BC/C htlc B/2 | | | receiver contract sig
G.BC/C+CD/C B+D/2-----------------------> | | (7)
H. ************** BROADCAST AND MINE CHARLIE FUNDING TX ************** |
I. C fund ----------------------------------------> | (3)
J. <----------------------------------------CD/D+DA/D htlc | (4)
K. CD/D htlc ----------------------> | | (E)
L. <---------------------- CD/D htlc C/2 | | (F)
M.CD/D+DA/D C+D/2----------------------------------------> | (7)
N. ************** BROADCAST AND MINE DENNIS FUNDING TX *************** |
O. DA/A htlc ----------------------------------------> | (E)
P. <---------------------------------------- DA/A htlc D/2 | (F)
Q. hash preimage ----> | | | hash preimage
R. <---- privB(B+C) | | | privkey handover
S. privA(A+B) ----> | | | (R)
T. hash preimage ----------------------> | | (Q)
U. <---------------------- privC(C+D) | | (R)
V. privB(B+C) ----------------------> | | (R)
W. hash preimage ----------------------------------------> | (Q)
X <---------------------------------------- privD(D+A) | (R)
Y. privC(C+D) ----------------------------------------> | (R)
In the codebase and protocol documentation the words "Sender" and "Receiver" are used. These refer to either side of a coinswap address. The entity which created a transaction paying into a coinswap address is called the sender, because they sent the coins into the coinswap address. The other entity is called the receiver, because they will receive the coins after the coinswap is complete.
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gmaxwell's original coinswap writeup from 2013. It explains how CoinSwap actually works. If you already understand how Lightning payment channels work then CoinSwap is similar.
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Design for improving JoinMarket's resistance to sybil attacks using fidelity bonds. Document explaining the concept of fidelity bonds and how they provide resistance against sybil attacks.
- ☑ learn rust
- ☑ learn rust-bitcoin
- ☑ design a protocol where all the features (vanilla coinswap, multi-tx coinswap, routed coinswap, branching routed coinswap, privkey handover) can be done, and publish to mailing list
- ☑ code the simplest possible wallet, seed phrases "generate" and "recover", no fidelity bonds, everything is sybil attackable or DOS attackable for now, no RBF
- ☑ implement creation and signing of traditional multisig
- ☑ code makers and takers to support simple coinswap
- ☑ code makers and takers to support multi-transaction coinswaps without any security (e.g. no broadcasting of contract transactions)
- ☑ code makers and takers to support multi-hop coinswaps without security
- ☑ write more developer documentation
- ☐ set up a solution to mirror this repository somewhere else in case github rm's it like they did youtube-dl
- ☑ implement and deploy fidelity bonds in joinmarket, to experiment and gain experience with the concept
- ☑ add proper error handling to this project, as right now most of the time it will exit on anything unexpected
- ☐ code security, recover from aborts and deveations
- ☐ code fidelity bonds
- ☐ implement coinswap fees and taker paying for miner fees
- ☐ code federated message board seeder servers
- ☐ RELEASE FOR TESTNET
- ☐ add support for miner fees and precomputed RBF fee-bumps, so that txes can always be confirmed regardless of the block space market
- ☐ automated tests (might be earlier in case its useful in test driven development)
- ☐ move wallet files and config to its own data directory ~/.teleport/
- ☐ add collateral inputs to receiver contract txes
- ☐ add automated incremental backups for wallet files, because seed phrases aren't enough to back up these wallets
- ☐ RELEASE FOR MAINNET
- ☐ study ecdsa-2p and implement ecdsa-2p multisig so the coinswaps can look identical to regular txes
- ☐ implement branching and merging coinswaps for takers, so that they can create coinswaps even if they just have one UTXO
- ☐ add encrypted wallet files
- ☐ reproducible builds + pin dependencies to a hash
- ☐ break as many blockchain analysis heuristics as possible, e.g. change address detection
- ☐ payjoin-with-coinswap with decoy UTXOs
- ☐ convert contracts which currently use script to instead use adaptor signatures, aiming to not reveal contracts in the backout case
- ☐ abstract away the Core RPC so that its functions can be done in another way, for example for the taker being supported as a plugin for electrum
- ☐ randomized locktimes, study with bayesian inference the best way to randomize them so that an individual maker learns as little information as possible from the locktime value
- ☐ anti-DOS protocol additions for maker (not using json but some kind of binary format that is harder to DOS)
- ☐ make the project into a plugin which can be used by other wallets to do the taker role, try to implement it for electrum wallet
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IRC channel:
#coinswap
. Logs available here. Accessible on the libera IRC network atirc.libera.chat:6697 (TLS)
and on the webchat client. Accessible anonymously to Tor users on the Hackint network atncwkrwxpq2ikcngxq3dy2xctuheniggtqeibvgofixpzvrwpa77tozqd.onion:6667
. -
Chris Belcher's work diary: https://gist.github.com/chris-belcher/ca5051285c6f8d38693fd127575be44d