A C# application that unhooks AV and EDR to help run malicious code undetected. This differs to this classic unhooking technique because it does not need to load the 'clean' copy of ntdll.dll from disk, it copies it from another process before AV/EDR can hook it.
The concept is very similar, overwrite hooked syscalls with clean versions (unhooked).
This C# code is based upon one of the techniques demonstrated in the RED TEAM Operator: Windows Evasion Course from Sektor7, the original, developed by Sektor7, is written in C/C++. I would recommend any of the malware development courses, there is a lot of great stuff to learn about creating malware in C/C++.
The blog entry can be found here. Apparently, Fart in Swedish translates to speed in English (this technique loads a new process in a suspended state, before AV/EDR can hook ntdll.dll), fart is also luck in Polish. A quick Google tells me that Perun is a Slavic God (this was confirmed in an email from Sektor7).
The following image shows the ZwCreateProcess function when BitDefender is disabled:
When I run the program again, but this time with BitDefender enabled, we can see that the ZwCreateProcess syscall in ntdll.dll is hooked, this is apparent by the JMP instruction:
When Perun's Fart has completed unhooking ntdll.dll we can see that the syscall is back to normal (although the symbol is now NtCreateProcess):
Execution of the code is shown below:
Creating a new process to read in a clean copy of NTDLL
[+] New process created. Pid: 6700
[+] Getting Module Size: ntdll
[+] Got Module base address: 0x7FFC92E00000
[+] Module is a valid image.
[+] e_lfanew equals 0xE0
[+] NT_HEADERS address is 0x7FFC92E000E0
[+] Module NT Headers is valid.
[+] ntdll Module Size: 2019328 bytes
[+] Bytes read from remote process memory: 2019328 bytes
[+] Killing process. Pid: 6700
[+] Done
Unhooking NTDLL
[+] Sections to enumerate is 9
[+] First section is .text
[+] First section is at 0x1E912279CA8
[+] Analysing section .text
[+] .text section is at 0x1E912279CA8
[+] First syscall found at offset: 0x9F9E0, addr: 0x7FFC92E9F9E0
[+] Last syscall found at offset: 0xA33C8, addr: 0x7FFC92EA33C8
[+] VirtualProtect Dll to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE...
[+] Unhooking Dll by copying clean data...
[+] VirtualProtect Dll to OldProtect
[+] Done
I have not injected any shellcode in the PoC. The technique achieves the same result as this technique, see notes below for BitDefender specifics.
The code can be changed to unhook any loaded DLL. BitDefender hooks ntdll.dll and kernelbase.dll.
Upon loading the suspended process I used Process Hacker to see which modules had been loaded and unfortunately only ntdll.dll is loaded (this makes sense in hindsight):
Still, it could be used in conjunction with direct system calls to ntdll.