Network Working Group W. Hardaker
Internet-Draft USC/ISI
Intended status: Standards Track 12 August 2022
Expires: 13 February 2023
Remove SHA-1 from active use within DNSSEC
draft-hardaker-dnsop-must-not-sha1-00
Abstract
This document retires the use of SHA-1 within DNSSEC
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 13 February 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Hardaker Expires 13 February 2023 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft MUST NOT DNSSEC with SHA-1 August 2022
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Deprecating SHA-1 algorithms in DNSSEC . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Appendix B. Current algorithm usage levels . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Appendix C. Github Version of this document . . . . . . . . . . 5
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
The security of the SHA-1 algorithm [RFC3174] has been slowly
diminishing over time as various forms of attacks have weakened its
cryptographic underpinning. DNSSEC [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035]
originally made extensive use of SHA-1 as a cryptographic
verification algorithm in RRSIG and Delegation Signer (DS) records,
for example. Since then, multiple other signing algorithms with
stronger cryptographic strength are now widely available for DS
records (such as SHA-256 [RFC4509], SHA-384 ([RFC6605])) and for
DNSKEY and RRSIG records (such as RSASHA256 ([RFC5702]), RSASHA512
([RFC5702]), ECDSAP256SHA256 [RFC6605], ECDSAP384SHA384 [RFC6605],
ED25519 [RFC8080], and ED448 [RFC8080]), the use of SHA-1 is no
longer needed.
This document retires the use of SHA-1 within DNSSEC.
1.1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Deprecating SHA-1 algorithms in DNSSEC
The SHA-1 [RFC3685] algorithm MUST NOT be used when creating DS
records.
Hardaker Expires 13 February 2023 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft MUST NOT DNSSEC with SHA-1 August 2022
The RSASHA1 [RFC4034], DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 [RFC5155], and
RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 [RFC5155] algorithms MUST NOT be used when
creating DNSKEY and RRSIG records.
3. Security Considerations
This document increases the security of the DNSSEC ecosystem by
deprecating algorithms that make use of older algorithms with SHA-1
derived uses.
4. Operational Considerations
Zone owners currently making use of SHA-1 based algorithms should
immediate switch to algorithms with stronger cryptographic strengths,
such as those listed in the introduction. DNS registries [RFC8499]
should prohibit their clients to upload and publish SHA-1 based DS
records.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to mark the following Delegation Signer (DS)
Resource Record (RR) digest type algorithms as deprecated:
* SHA-1
IANA is requested to mark the following DNS Security Algorithm
Numbers as deprecated:
* RSASHA1
* DSA-NSEC3-SHA1
* RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3174] Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
(SHA1)", RFC 3174, DOI 10.17487/RFC3174, September 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3174>.
Hardaker Expires 13 February 2023 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft MUST NOT DNSSEC with SHA-1 August 2022
[RFC3685] Daboo, C., "SIEVE Email Filtering: Spamtest and VirusTest
Extensions", RFC 3685, DOI 10.17487/RFC3685, February
2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3685>.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
[RFC4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
(DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4509, May 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4509>.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155>.
[RFC5702] Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY
and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5702,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5702, October 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5702>.
[RFC6605] Hoffman, P. and W.C.A. Wijngaards, "Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 6605,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6605, April 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6605>.
[RFC8080] Sury, O. and R. Edmonds, "Edwards-Curve Digital Security
Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 8080,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8080, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8080>.
6.2. Informative References
Hardaker Expires 13 February 2023 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft MUST NOT DNSSEC with SHA-1 August 2022
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8499] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", BCP 219, RFC 8499, DOI 10.17487/RFC8499,
January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
TBD
Appendix B. Current algorithm usage levels
The DNSSEC scanning project by Viktor Dukhovni and Wes Hardaker
highlights the current deployment of various algorithms on the
https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/ website.
[RFC Editor: please delete this section upon publication]
Appendix C. Github Version of this document
While this document is under development, it can be viewed, tracked,
fill here:
https://github.com/hardaker/draft-hardaker-dnsop-must-not-sha1
Author's Address
Wes Hardaker
USC/ISI
Email: ietf@hardakers.net
Hardaker Expires 13 February 2023 [Page 5]