Brume Wallet ☁️

The private Ethereum wallet with built-in Tor

TLDR

Anonymous requests using Tor (the dark net)
Built for strong zero-cost privacy and security
Available as an extension and on a website
Won EthBrno 2022 hackathon (+ design award)
Made by two French cypherpunks
Almost the same features as MetaMask

How do I know that my current wallet leaks my IP address?

Add our proxy to your networks on your current wallet

Network name: Brume Proxy

New RPC URL: https://proxy.haz.workers.dev

Chain ID: 1

Currency Symbol: ETH

Go on the logs website https://logs.brume.money/

Getting started

You can use Brume Wallet as an extension and on a website

Using the website

Click here https://wallet.brume.money

Installing the extension

Chrome / Brave / Chromium

Click here

Firefox

Click here

Chrome (permanent developer mode)

Download and extract the chrome.zip file on the release page
Open Chrome, open settings
Left panel, bottom, click Extensions
Top bar, right, enable Developer mode
Click Load unpacked
Select the folder where chrome.zip was extracted

Firefox (temporary developer mode)

Download and extract the firefox.zip file on the release page
Open Firefox, navigate to about:debugging
Left panel, click This Firefox
Temporary Extensions, click Load Temporary Add-on
Navigate to the Brume Wallet folder
Open the folder where firefox.zip was extracted
Select the manifest.json file

Safari (temporary developer mode)

Get a mac
Install Xcode
Enable Developer mode in Safari
Build the extension
Run npm run xcode
Enter y to everything and/or ignore warnings

Xcode will start

Top bar, center, left, select brume-wallet (macOS)
Top bar, left, click the play button to build the extension
Open Safari
Reach macOS toolbar, click Development, click Allow unsigned extensions at the very bottom
Reach macOS toolbar, click Safari, click Settings
Top bar, click Extensions, find Brume Wallet, enable it

Reproducible building

Installing and building

Install node v20.3.1 (npm v9.6.7)
Clone the repository

git clone https://github.com/brumewallet/wallet && cd wallet

Build the website and extension

npm install && npm run build && npm run zip

Website and extension files are in the dist folder

Comparing released files with built files

GitHub Actions automatically rebuilds each release and checks that the committed files are the same as the built ones

https://github.com/brumewallet/wallet/actions/workflows/release.yml

You can check the comparison yourself by running the following

# Unzip committed zip files into ./unzipped
mkdir ./unzipped
unzip ./dist/chrome.zip -d ./unzipped/chrome
unzip ./dist/firefox.zip -d ./unzipped/firefox
unzip ./dist/safari.zip -d ./unzipped/safari
unzip ./dist/website.zip -d ./unzipped/website

# Build folders into ./dist
npm ci && npm run build

# Compare unzipped committed zip files and built folders
diff -r ./unzipped/chrome ./dist/chrome
diff -r ./unzipped/firefox ./dist/firefox
diff -r ./unzipped/safari ./dist/safari
diff -r ./unzipped/website ./dist/website

# Clean ./unzipped
rm -rf ./unzipped

# Restore built zip files
git restore ./dist/chrome.zip
git restore ./dist/firefox.zip
git restore ./dist/safari.zip
git restore ./dist/website.zip

# Compare other files
[[ -z $(git status --porcelain) ]]
echo $?

Secure by design

Encrypted storage

Your storage is hashed and encrypted using strong cryptography algorithms and parameters

Cryptography algorithms are seeded by PBKDF2 with 1M+ iterations from your password
All storage keys are hashed using HMAC-SHA256, it is impossible to retrieve the original key
All storage values are encrypted using AES-256-GCM, each with a different ciphertext/IV

Authenticated storage

Some critical entities like private keys and seed phrases are stored in WebAuthn and require authentication (FaceID/TouchID)

They are encrypted before being stored in WebAuthn storage
Their reference ID and encryption IV are stored in encrypted storage (the one we talked above)

Nobody can access your private keys or seed phrases without your password + authentication (FaceID/TouchID)

This mitigates supply-chain attacks and phishing attacks, and prevents phone-left-on-the-table attacks

Supply-chain hardened

We try our best to avoid supply-chain attacks from external packages

We use browser APIs when available
All WebAssembly packages are reproducible and try to use audited dependencies
All JavaScript cryptography packages are from Paul Miller and are audited
We count each individual maintainer in our dependency graph as a risk
We use runtime protection techniques such as object-capability model
(Soon) We upload each release on IPFS and publish the hash on Ethereum

Safe Tor and TLS protocols

We use the Tor and the TLS protocols in a way that's mostly safe, even though they are not fully implemented nor audited

Keep in mind that the zero risk doesn't exist, and a highly motivated attacker could deanonymize you by doing the following steps (very unlikely to happen):

Owning the entry node, and logging all IP addresses using Brume Wallet, something he could know by:

Deep packet inspection, since our Tor/TLS packets may not be like those from regular Tor/TLS users
Behaviour analysis, since our Tor/TLS may not behave the same way as regular Tor/TLS implementations

Owning the JSON-RPC server, and logging all wallet addresses that used Tor

(Or owning the exit node, since we don't currently check TLS certificates from the JSON-RPC server, the exit node could send your packets to its own JSON-RPC server (Fixed soon))

Correlating IP addresses logs with wallet addresses logs, and if both sides are small enough, linking a particular IP address to a particular wallet address

rixcian/brume