Checksec is a bash scrip to check executable properties like (PIE, RELRO, PaX, Canaries, ASLR, Fortify Source). It has been originally written by Tobias Klein and the original source is available here: http://www.trapkit.de/tools/checksec.html
Last Update: 10-20-2015
normal (or --format cli)
$checksec.sh --file /bin/ls
RELRO STACK CANARY NX PIE RPATH RUNPATH FILE
Partial RELRO Canary found NX enabled No PIE No RPATH No RUNPATH /bin/ls
csv
$ checksec.sh --format csv --file /bin/ls
Partial RELRO,Canary found,NX enabled,No PIE,No RPATH,No RUNPATH,/bin/ls
xml
$ checksec.sh --format xml --file /bin/ls
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<file relro="partial" canary="yes" nx="yes" pie="no" rpath="no" runpath="no" filename='/bin/ls'/>
json $ checksec.sh --format json --file /bin/ls { "file": { "relro":"partial","canary":"yes","nx":"yes","pie":"no","rpath":"no","runpath":"no","filename":"/bin/ls" } }
Fortify test in cli
$ checksec.sh --fortify-proc 1
* Process name (PID) : init (1)
* FORTIFY_SOURCE support available (libc) : Yes
* Binary compiled with FORTIFY_SOURCE support: Yes
------ EXECUTABLE-FILE ------- . -------- LIBC --------
FORTIFY-able library functions | Checked function names
-------------------------------------------------------
fdelt_chk | __fdelt_chk
read | __read_chk
syslog_chk | __syslog_chk
fprintf_chk | __fprintf_chk
vsnprintf_chk | __vsnprintf_chk
fgets | __fgets_chk
strncpy | __strncpy_chk
snprintf_chk | __snprintf_chk
memset | __memset_chk
strncat_chk | __strncat_chk
memcpy | __memcpy_chk
fread | __fread_chk
sprintf_chk | __sprintf_chk
SUMMARY:
* Number of checked functions in libc : 78
* Total number of library functions in the executable: 116
* Number of FORTIFY-able functions in the executable : 13
* Number of checked functions in the executable : 7
* Number of unchecked functions in the executable : 6
Kernel test in Cli
$ checksec.sh --kernel
* Kernel protection information:
Description - List the status of kernel protection mechanisms. Rather than
inspect kernel mechanisms that may aid in the prevention of exploitation of
userspace processes, this option lists the status of kernel configuration
options that harden the kernel itself against attack.
Kernel config: /proc/config.gz
GCC stack protector support: Enabled
Strict user copy checks: Disabled
Enforce read-only kernel data: Disabled
Restrict /dev/mem access: Enabled
Restrict /dev/kmem access: Enabled
* grsecurity / PaX: Auto GRKERNSEC
Non-executable kernel pages: Enabled
Non-executable pages: Enabled
Paging Based Non-executable pages: Enabled
Restrict MPROTECT: Enabled
Address Space Layout Randomization: Enabled
Randomize Kernel Stack: Enabled
Randomize User Stack: Enabled
Randomize MMAP Stack: Enabled
Sanitize freed memory: Enabled
Sanitize Kernel Stack: Enabled
Prevent userspace pointer deref: Enabled
Prevent kobject refcount overflow: Enabled
Bounds check heap object copies: Enabled
JIT Hardening: Enabled
Thread Stack Random Gaps: Enabled
Disable writing to kmem/mem/port: Enabled
Disable privileged I/O: Enabled
Harden module auto-loading: Enabled
Chroot Protection: Enabled
Deter ptrace process snooping: Enabled
Larger Entropy Pools: Enabled
TCP/UDP Blackhole: Enabled
Deter Exploit Bruteforcing: Enabled
Hide kernel symbols: Enabled
* Kernel Heap Hardening: No KERNHEAP
The KERNHEAP hardening patchset is available here:
https://www.subreption.com/kernheap/
Kernel Test in XML
$ checksec.sh --format xml --kernel
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<kernel config='/boot/config-3.11-2-amd64' gcc_stack_protector='yes' strict_user_copy_check='no' ro_kernel_data='yes' restrict_dev_mem_access='yes' restrict_dev_kmem_access='no'>
<grsecurity config='no' />
<kernheap config='no' />
</kernel>
Kernel Test in Json
$ checksec.sh --format json --kernel
{ "kernel": { "KernelConfig":"/boot/config-3.11-2-amd64","gcc_stack_protector":"yes","strict_user_copy_check":"no","ro_kernel_data":"yes","restrict_dev_mem_access":"yes","restrict_dev_kmem_access":"no" },{ "grsecurity_config":"no" },{ "kernheap_config":"no" } }
Due to the original structure of the script the --format argument should be placed first on the command line arguments. Doing differently would require really big changes in the code.