Bypass for CS:GO's LoadLibrary injection prevention mechanism, achieved by patching one byte of game memory.
The game hooks NtOpenFile function from ntdll.dll. The disassembly of the replacement function is listed below:
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
push esi
mov esi, [ebp+arg_8]
mov eax, [esi+8]
mov eax, [eax+4]
test eax, eax ; is ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer not null
jz short loc_4095BB ; we patch this with 'jmp' to skip loc_4095A1
loc_4095A1:
test byte ptr [ebp+arg_4], 20h ; check if DesiredAccess has FILE_EXECUTE flag set (whether we're loading a dll)
jz short loc_4095BB ; if it's not a dll, call original
push eax ; ObjectAttributes->ObjectName->Buffer
call sub_40D460 ; verify the dll
test al, al ; check if dll is allowed to load
jnz short loc_4095BB ; if the dll passed verification call original
mov eax, 0C0000034h ; return STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
pop esi
pop ebp
retn 18h
loc_4095BB:
push [ebp+arg_14]
push [ebp+arg_10]
push [ebp+arg_C]
push esi
push [ebp+arg_4]
push [ebp+arg_0]
call originalNtOpenFile
pop esi
pop ebp
retn 18hAn alternative approach which also bypasses anti-loadlibrary protection is to restore 5 first bytes of original NtOpenFile. Below is an example of that coded in C:
// Restore original NtOpenFile from external process
LPVOID ntOpenFile = GetProcAddress(LoadLibraryW(L"ntdll"), "NtOpenFile");
if (ntOpenFile) {
char originalBytes[5];
memcpy(originalBytes, ntOpenFile, 5);
WriteProcessMemory(csgoProcessHandle, ntOpenFile, originalBytes, 5, NULL);
}For increased safety you can backup the patched first five bytes of NtOpenFile and restore them after injection.
Many Manual Mapping dll injectors create thread in target process to load dll or perform initialization. This is what CS:GO devs target in addition to LoadLibrary detection. Thread detection doesn't affect LoadLibrary injectors.
DllMain function of client.dll contains code that on DLL_THREAD_ATTACH calls NtQueryInformationThread function from ntdll.dll to get start address of newly created thread:
push ebp
mov ebp, esp
mov eax, [ebp+fdwReason]
sub esp, 20h
cmp eax, 1
jz loc_106390D3 ; if fdwReason is DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH, skip
test eax, eax
jz loc_106390D3 ; if fdwReason is DLL_PROCESS_DETACH, skip
cmp eax, 2
jnz loc_106390D3 ; if fdwReason is not DLL_THREAD_ATTACH, skip
push esi
push edi
mov [ebp+phModule], 0
call ds:GetCurrentThreadId
push offset aNtqueryinforma ; "NtQueryInformationThread"
push offset aNtdllDll ; "ntdll.dll"
mov edi, eax
call ds:GetModuleHandleA
push eax
call ds:GetProcAddress
mov esi, eax
test esi, esi
jz short loc_106390C6 ; we patch this with 'jmp' to skip loc_106390B2
push 0
push 4
lea eax, [ebp+fdwReason]
push eax
push 9 ; ThreadQuerySetWin32StartAddress
call ds:GetCurrentThread
push eax
call esi ; get thread start address from NtQueryInformationThread
test eax, eax
jnz short loc_106390C6
push 1Ch
lea eax, [ebp+Buffer]
push eax
push [ebp+fdwReason]
call ds:VirtualQuery
lea eax, [ebp+phModule]
push eax
push [ebp+fdwReason]
push 6
call ds:GetModuleHandleExA
mov ecx, [ebp+Buffer.Protect]
test eax, eax ; check if the address leads to a valid module
jz short loc_106390B2 ; if the code's been manually mapped save thread's characteristics
cmp ecx, 40h
jnz short loc_106390C6
loc_106390B2:
mov eax, [ebp+fdwReason]
mov dword_1528625C, eax ; save thread start address
mov dword_15286260, edi ; save thread id
mov dword_15286264, ecx ; save protection of memory at thread start address
loc_106390C6:
pop edi
mov eax, 1
pop esi
mov esp, ebp
pop ebp
retn 0Ch
loc_106390D3:
mov eax, 1
mov esp, ebp
pop ebp
retn 0Ch